On Point blog, page 71 of 133
Reasonable Suspicion – Frisk – Demand that Suspect Drop Object
State v. Jermichael James Carroll, 2010 WI 8, affirming 2008 WI App 161
For Carroll: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: Frisk analysis applies to police demand that suspect drop object in hand, ¶22.
¶23 Here, Carroll led officers on a high-speed chase in a car that the officers had been observing in connection with an armed robbery investigation, and exited his car quickly while holding an unknown object.
Miranda – Waiver – Voluntariness – Police Deception – “Incommunicado” Detention, etc.
State v. Jennifer L. Ward, 2009 WI 60, affirming unpublished opinion
For Ward: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue/Holding: Taken individually and collectively, Ward’s 3 statements were voluntary, weighing personal characteristics against police conduct.
Personal characteristics, ¶23. Ward was: “relatively sophisticated and intelligent”; 35 years old; a high school graduate; prior conviction; the daughter of a police chief. Her “unprompted understanding of her rights” indicated lack of vulnerability to police questioning.
Jury – Selection – Bias / Disqualification – Exercise of Discretion
State v. Mark H. Tody, 2009 WI 31, reversing unpublished opinion
For Tody: Byron C. Lichstein, UW Law School
Issue/Holding:
¶32 … The correct principle of law that should have guided the circuit court judge is that a circuit court judge should err on the side of dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror’s presence may create bias or an appearance of bias.
Noncustodial Administration of Rights: Obviates Need for Custodial Re-Administration
State v. Marchand Grady, 2009 WI 47, affirming summary order
For Grady: Carl W. Chessir
Issue: Whether administration of Miranda rights in a noncustodial setting obviated the need for re-administration of rights when the interview became custodial about 2 and one-half hours later.
Holding:
¶15 Grady advances a creative, but not heretofore unheard of argument. He asks us to adopt a bright-line rule requiring the administration of Miranda warnings after a person is placed in official custody,
Restitution – Hearing – Procedure – Notice, Discovery
State v. Alberto Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, on certification
For Fernandez: Eileen A. Hirsch, Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶59 Fernandez additionally argues that the lack of advance written notice of the Dalka and CNR claims violated his due process rights. In response, the State contends that Fernandez’s due process rights were protected by the statute, which provides for “an opportunity to be heard,
Restitution – Limitations – Exercise of Discretion: Reimbursement to Insurance Company
State v. Alberto Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, on certification
For Fernandez: Eileen A. Hirsch, Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶61 Fernandez says the court erred by ordering full restitution to two insurance companies because a court is authorized to do so only where justice requires. Fernandez says that justice does not require a man who washes dishes for a living to reimburse insurance companies worth billions of dollars.
Waiver – As Rule of Judicial Administration
State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers
Issue/Holding:
¶43 Long did not advance this statutory interpretation argument at the circuit court or at the court of appeals. Normally, under such circumstances, we would conclude that an issue neither raised nor briefed is waived. Long’s sole recourse would be to file a motion for post-conviction relief,
Restitution – Ability to Pay not Limited by Length of Sentence or Probation
State v. Alberto Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, on certification
For Fernandez: Eileen A. Hirsch, Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the holding of State v. Mark M. Loutsch, 2003 WI App 16, ¶25, “that the court order at sentencing an amount of restitution that it determines the defendant will be able to pay before the completion of the sentence,” is valid.
First Amendment (Freedom of Speech) – Applied to Identity Theft, § 943.201(2)(c): Charge Survives Strict Scrutiny
State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn
Issue/Holding: The identity theft charge against Baron, sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation as a government official, survives strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment (freedom of speech clause):
¶45 To survive strict scrutiny, the State has the burden to show that the “‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’”
First Amendment (Freedom of Speech) – Applied to Identity Theft, § 943.201(2)(c): Content-Based Speech
State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn
Issue/Holding: The charge of identity theft, based on Baron’s alleged conduct in sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation, is “content based” within the meaning of First Amendment analysis:
¶38 In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis.