On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Melvin Bridges, 2009 WI 66, PFR filed 5/18/09
For Bridges: Michael S. Holzman

Issue/Holding: Frisk of Bridges during routine traffic stop (defective brake lights) upheld, where the early-evening stop was in an area “where the police had received numerous complaints of gunshots fired at night,” and Bridges when pulled over had made “a questionable movement”; State v. Gary A. Johnson,

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether use of force element of second-degree sexual assault was established where the defendant asked the complainant to rate his penis then hugged her so that she could feel his penis through their clothing.

Holding:

¶24      Long’s arguments are not persuasive.

State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Prior conviction for a violent crime is element, not penalty enhancer, of stalking, §§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a):

¶30      First, sub. (2m)(a) designates a list of specific crimes that elevate a simple stalking offense to a Class H felony. These enumerated prior convictions are for a specific set of violent crimes,

State v. Kelly R. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, reversing unpublished opinion
For Ferguson: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where it was clear not only that Ferguson obstructed the police outsideher apartment but also that the jury so found, arguable omission of a “complete” instruction on whether the police acted with lawful authority in entering her apartment was harmless:

¶43      The jury instruction here was a correct statement of the law for police actions outside of Ferguson’s home.

State v. Kelly R. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, reversing unpublished opinion
For Ferguson: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶31      Because “lawful authority” is an element of obstruction under Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), if the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of “lawful authority,” given the facts presented to the jury, the circuit court erred.See Harvey,

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding:

¶25      Kramer argues that the “totally divorced” language from Cady means that the officer must have ruled out any possibility of criminal activity before the community caretaker function is bona fide. The State, on the other hand,

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding: The 3-factor test for determining validity of community caretaker intervention, as articulated by State v. Anderson, 142 Wis.  2d 162, 167, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987), and the lead opinion of State v. Kelsey C.R.

State v. Mitchell A. Lange, 2009 WI 49, reversing unpublished opinion
For Lange: Steven M. Cohen

Issue/Holding:

¶2       We are asked to determine whether a law enforcement officer complied with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when obtaining a blood sample from the defendant without a warrant to do so. Our prior cases establish that a warrantless blood sample taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer is consistent with the Fourth Amendment under the following circumstances: “(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation or crime,

State v. Christopher S. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, affirming 2008 WI App 89
For Hoppe: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Notwithstanding “irregularities” with respect to the burden of proof, the hearing on Hoppe’s Bangert challenge established that his plea was knowing and voluntary, given “the circuit court’s findings … that the circuit court disbelieved the defendant’s claims that he did not receive and did not understand the information that was provided in the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form but that was not provided to the defendant during the plea colloquy,” ¶¶46-58.

Milton J. Christensen, et al. v. Sullivan, et al., 2009 WI 87, reversing 2008 WI App 18
For Christensen: Peter M. Koneazny, Patrick O. Patterson

Issue: Whether remedial contempt supports monetary sanction for past acts (here: intentional violations of jail-overcrowding consent decree) where the sanctionable conduct has terminated.

Holding: Remedial sanction, including monetary award, is limited to “continuing” contempt of court,