On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. James E. Brown, 2006 WI 100, reversing summary order
For Brown: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: A plea colloquy is not required to caution the defendant that punishment for each of multiple charges could be imposed consecutively, ¶78.

State v. Scott K. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, on certification
For Fisher: Paul B. Millis

Issue: Whether the right to bear arms provision of Wis. Const. Art. I, § 25 countenances prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon in a car’s console by a tavern owner who asserted its necessity for security purposes in that he routinely transported large amounts of cash.

Holding:

¶5        … (W)e conclude that § 941.23 is constitutional as applied to Fisher because his interest in exercising his right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh the state’s interest in enforcing § 941.23.…

¶18      … Defendants have the burden of proof.

Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order

Issue/Holding: The circuit court must undertake a colloquy with the parent tracking § 48.422(7); the parent must know the rights being waived; and on a challenge to the plea the parent must make a prima facie showing that the colloquy was defective and also allege a lack of understanding of the omitted information, ¶¶25-26,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶28 In terms of the length of his sentence, Taylor argues that there appeared to be no “starting point” for the court of some very low period of confinement, or even the period of confinement recommended by the PSI writer. We cannot agree.

State v. Roger S. Walker, 2006 WI 82, affirming as modified summary order
For Walker: James Rebholz

Issue/Holding: In order to obtain review, a defendant must file a postconviction motion to modify sentence, even if the event was a re-sentencing which came to the same result as originally imposed.

¶37      In the hope of clarifying appellate procedure, we conclude that when a defendant seeks modification of the sentence imposed at resentencing,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: TIS sentence of 18 years (12 in, 6 out) for child sexual assault, consecutive to 5 year indeterminate sentence for similar offense, was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding PSI recommendation of 12 years (6 in, 6 out), nonviolent nature of act, and closeness of victim to age of consent:

¶35 Although we recognize the accuracy of many of Taylor’s assertions,

State v. Charles E. Young, 2006 WI 98, affirming 2004 WI App 227
For Young: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶19      … (T)his court ordinarily adopts and follows the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.…

¶27      Young, however, argues that we should reject Hodari D. and interpret Article I,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17        The standards governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well settled. [9] A circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.

…

¶27      All told,

State ex rel Marvin Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, reversing and remandingsummary order of court of appeals
For Coleman: Brian Kinstler

Issue/Holding:

¶28      Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party asserting laches: lack of knowledge (that the claim would be brought) and effect (prejudice).

Village of Cross Plains v. Kristin J. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, reversing unpublished decision
For Haanstad: John M. Gerlach

Issue: Whether sitting in the driver’s seat of a running, parked car is, without more, “operating” a motor vehicle within § 346.63.

Holding:

¶15 The term “operate” is defined in § 346.63(3)(b), which reads: “‘Operate’” means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”¶16 The court of appeals’