On Point: 2005-06 Term

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: TIS sentence of 18 years (12 in, 6 out) for child sexual assault, consecutive to 5 year indeterminate sentence for similar offense, was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding PSI recommendation of 12 years (6 in, 6 out), nonviolent nature of act, and closeness of victim to age of consent:

¶35 Although we recognize the accuracy of many of Taylor’s assertions,

State v. Charles E. Young, 2006 WI 98, affirming 2004 WI App 227
For Young: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶19      … (T)his court ordinarily adopts and follows the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.…

¶27      Young, however, argues that we should reject Hodari D. and interpret Article I,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17        The standards governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well settled. [9] A circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.

…

¶27      All told,

State ex rel Marvin Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, reversing and remandingsummary order of court of appeals
For Coleman: Brian Kinstler

Issue/Holding:

¶28      Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party asserting laches: lack of knowledge (that the claim would be brought) and effect (prejudice).

Village of Cross Plains v. Kristin J. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, reversing unpublished decision
For Haanstad: John M. Gerlach

Issue: Whether sitting in the driver’s seat of a running, parked car is, without more, “operating” a motor vehicle within § 346.63.

Holding:

¶15 The term “operate” is defined in § 346.63(3)(b), which reads: “‘Operate’” means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”¶16 The court of appeals’

State v. Jamale A. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, reversing unpublished decision
For Bonds: Jeremy C. Perri, Diana M. Felsmann, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether CCAP entries can satisfy the State’s burden of proving a repeater allegation.

Holding: Although the rules of evidence do not apply to proof of a repeater and a prior conviction need not be proved by certification,

(¶46) a CCAP report,

State v. Jamale A. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, reversing unpublished decision
For Bonds: Jeremy C. Perri, Diana M. Felsmann, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether post-plea amendment of the repeater allegation to change its basis prejudiced the defendant hence was improper.

Holding:

¶31      It is the State’s burden to prove that Bonds was not prejudiced and Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) was satisfied through notice of sufficient allegations of the basis for charging habitual criminality. 

State v. Jamale A. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, reversing unpublished decision
For Bonds: Jeremy C. Perri, Diana M. Felsmann, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶30      When considered together, this precedent establishes the following principles:

(1) The purpose of the allegations of repeater status in a charging document is to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the potential maximum penalty he faces in order that the defendant may make an informed plea. 

State v. Brian Hibl, 2006 WI 52, reversing 2005 WI App 228
For Hibl: Joel H. Rosenthal

Issue: Whether an identification resulting from an “accidental” encounter between witness and defendant in a courthouse hallway immediately before trial is suppressible, in the absence of any evidence that this incident involved a law enforcement procedure directed at obtaining an identification.

Holding:

¶31      For the reasons stated below,

State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶33      The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause right to present a defense requires that a defendant be allowed to introduce relevant evidence, subject to reasonable restrictions. …

¶34      The right to present a defense does not require that a defendant be allowed to present irrelevant evidence.