On Point: 2010-11 Term

State v. Charles Lamar, 2011 WI 50, affirming 2009 WI App 133; for Lamar: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Sentence Credit, Previously Imposed Sentence, § 973.04

Two concurrent sentences were initially imposed following guilty pleas to aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as repeater. The Agg Batt plea was withdrawn on postconviction motion, but the bail jumping wasn’t challenged.

State v. Deandre A. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, affirming unpublished CIA decision; for Buchanan: Tyler William Wickman; case activity

Frisk – Auto

Frisk of Buchanan, following routine traffic stop for speeding, was supported by reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous.

¶3   We hold that under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trooper’s observation of Buchanan’s furtive movements and visible nervousness,

State v. Brian T. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, on certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Consent to Search – Co-Tenant – Georgia v. Randolph

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) holds that a physically present resident’s objection trumps a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search of a residence.

Susan Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop’s Grove Condominium Association, Inc., 2011 WI 36, on certification; case activity

Standing – Generally

Lead opinion (3-Justice):

¶5   There is no single longstanding or uniform test to determine standing in the case law.  Courts have inconsistently used a variety of terminologies as tests for standing.  Therefore, as a prerequisite to answering the first question, we review the law of standing. 

State v. Omer Ninham, 2011 WI 33, affirming, 2009 WI App 64; for Ninham: Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Bryan Stevenson; amici: Byron C. Lichstein, Robert R. Henak, G. Michael Halfenger, et al.; case activity

Sentencing – Life without Parole for Juveniles – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Sentence of life without parole imposed on juvenile (Ninham was 14 when he committed the crime) upheld,

Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, on certification; for Jacob T.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(6) – “Substantial Parental Relationship”

¶22  The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. 

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,

State v. Shantell T. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, affirming unpublished decision; for Harbor: Joseph E. Redding; case activity

Sentence Modification – New Factor

The “new factor” test for sentence modification has split into “two divergent lines of cases”: Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (fact(s) highly relevant to, but not brought out at, 

State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, affirming 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Confrontation – Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶34  We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. 

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.