On Point blog, page 3 of 4
SCOW: Passenger’s question–“Got a warrant for that?”–was too ambiguous to limit the consent to search given by the driver
State v. Derik J. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 7/11/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity
A four-justice majority of the supreme court holds that a police officer lawfully searched a briefcase found in a vehicle during a traffic stop because the driver consented to a search of the car and the passenger did not unequivocally withdraw the consent given by the driver. Three dissenting judges take a very different view, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer should have realized that Wantland was withdrawing consent to a search of the briefcase.
SCOW: State can’t use defendant’s incriminating statements made as part of on-going, State-initiated, plea negotiations
State v. Rafeal Lyfold Myrick, 2014 WI 55, 7/10/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity
When does negotiation become agreement? In State v. Myrick, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s resolution of this question was critical in determining whether the State could use incriminating statements that the defendant had made at a co-defendant’s preliminary hearing. The issue arose because the plea negotiations (one theory) or the plea agreement (alternate theory) fell apart, leading to the defendant’s trial on the original homicide charge. On Point’s Special Guest Michael Tobin, Deputy SPD, offers his take on the issues.
SCOW rejects all constitutional challenges to new preliminary hearing hearsay rule, and rejects challenge to limitations on defense right to call and cross-examine witnesses at preliminary hearings
State v. O’Brien, et al., 2014 WI 54, 7/9/14, affirming published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity
The defendants challenged the constitutionality of recently enacted WI Stat. s. 970.038, which permits the use of hearsay at preliminary hearings, and allows a court to base a finding – that probable cause exists to hold a defendant for trial on a felony charge – entirely on hearsay. The Wisconsin Supreme Court cursorily rejected arguments that the new statute, as applied, violated their rights to confrontation, compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel and due process. Special Guest Marla Stephens, Director of the SPD’s Appellate Division, authored this post about the decision.
SCOW clarifies the forum and procedure for raising a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief
State ex re. Lorenzo D. Kyles v. William Pollard, 2013 WI 38, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Settling a somewhat obscure but still important point of appellate procedure, the supreme court unanimously holds that when a defendant seeks to reinstate the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under § 809.30(2)(b) based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice, he should file a habeas petition in the court of appeals as provided under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).
SCOW: Circuit court’s “morning after” sentencing regrets skirt Double Jeopardy violation
State v. Jacqueline Robinson, 2014 WI 35, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
From the majority opinion, this looks like an open and shut case. When sentencing Robinson, the trial judge said he misunderstood the sentence she had received in another matter. One day later, he recalled the case and increased the sentence. No double jeopardy violation here, says the majority, Robinson could not yet have had a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence. The 28-page concurrence and 20-page dissent suggest this case isn’t so simple.
“Under the facts presented,” lawyer did not violate ethics rules by disclosing confidential client information before a Machner hearing
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Peter J. Thompson, 2014 WI 25; case activity
The supreme court rejects OLR’s attempt to discipline a lawyer who disclosed confidential client information in advance of a Machner hearing, finding the context in which the disclosure was made to be “of critical importance” to its determination (¶26) while also reminding lawyers to “proceed with caution when considering disclosure of confidential client information in response to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” (¶1).
Under “unique facts of this case,” failure to report felony conviction to OLR in writing “too technical to justify imposition of legal consequences”
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Daniel W. Johns, Jr., 2014 WI 32; case activity
Because OLR was actually informed of an attorney’s felony conviction, the attorney’s failure to notify OLR of the conviction in writing under SCR 21.15(5) is “too technical” a violation to justify discipline. In addition, the nature of the conviction didn’t adversely reflect on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, so discipline was not merited under SCR 20:8.4(b).
SCOW: Circuit courts must decide expunction at sentencing
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 5/23/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Section 973.015 provides that a circuit court “may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence . . .” SCOW now clarifies that a court must decide expunction at sentencing. Circuit court practices varied, so this decision clarifies the law and sets the stage for (possibly) a bigger battle over Wisconsin’s expunction statute.
SCOW: Defendants can’t rely on DOC’s discharge certificate and repeated assurances that probation has ended
State ex rel. Ardonis Greer v. Wayne J. Widenhoeft, 2014 WI 19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity; Majority opinion: Justice Ziegler; Dissent: Justice Bradley and C.J. Abrahamson
The DOC assured Greer his probation was over and issued a discharge certificate to that effect. In truth, his probation term hadn’t yet expired. So when he committed new crimes, the DOC revoked his probation. The Majority rejects Greer’s claims that the DOC: (1) lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation, (2) denied due process, and (3) is subject to equitable estoppel.
SCOW: State would suffer “substantial prejudice” where pre-sentence plea withdrawal means loss of admissibility of child victim’s audiovisual statement
State v. Minerva Lopez, 2014 WI 11, reversing an unpublished summary disposition of the court of appeals (available here: MINERVA LOPEZ ORDER 3 8 13); case activity
Allowing the defendant to withdraw her no contest pleas would cause substantial prejudice to the state because it would mean the defendant’s trial would occur after the child victim turned 16 and would thus preclude state from presenting video statements of child under § 908.08.