On Point: 2014-15 Term

State v. Kearney W. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 12/18/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

At last, a unanimous SCOW decision settles how §973.015 is really supposed to work. Upon a young person’s successful completion of a sentence or probation, the detaining or probationary authority must issue a certificate of discharge to the court. This alerts the clerk to expunge the record. No petition is necessary. And once a court grants expungement, and the young person performs as required, the court cannot reverse its decision.

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

Practitioners take note. This opinion holds the seeds of controversy.  SCOW’s ruling–that forcing a defendant to bare his teeth to the jury does not violate the 5th Amendment–is not so surprising.  But Chief Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence, which announces the elimination of “opinion conferences” and new restrictions on the preparation of concurring and dissenting opinions seems alarming.

State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, 11/26/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013 WI App 108; majority opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity

Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which the state dropped a persistent repeater allegation, which carried a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release. But Dillard was never really subject to the persistent repeater law. When he discovered this fact after he was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea on the ground his decision to accept the plea bargain was based on his mistaken belief—one shared by the prosecutor, his lawyer, and the court—that he was facing a mandatory life sentence if he was convicted after a trial. The supreme court holds he is entitled to plea withdrawal because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and because his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to discover the persistent repeater law never applied to Dillard.