On Point blog, page 12 of 104
SCOW holds defendants abandoned by counsel to same standards as licensed lawyers
State v. Robert James Pope, Jr., 2019 WI 106, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
In the most absurd decision this term (still time for worse), SCOW has denied a defendant sentenced to life without parole both a direct appeal and a new trial because the court system destroyed all of his trial transcripts. The defendant “sat on his rights,” said the majority opinion, written by Justice Ziegler. When his lawyer failed to file a timely notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, he should have immediately, without counsel, figured out how to defend his appeal rights and effectively defended them. He didn’t. No relief.
SCOW does away with Dubose
State v. Stephan I. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 12/3/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1894, case activity (including briefs)
The result here is simple, and expected, given the current makeup of the court: a five-two majority to overturn State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Dubose held that “show up” identifications–those where the police present a witness with only one suspect–were inherently suggestive, and identifications so obtained would be inadmissible unless circumstances rendered the procedure “necessary.” So, now, Wisconsin courts will review claims that a show-up identification should be excluded under the test of State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995): a defendant must carry the initial burden to show the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and if he or she does, the state must then prove that the identification is nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
SCOW: 7 misdemeanor retail thefts can =1 felony theft
State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & State v. Amy J. Rodriguez, 2019 WI 101, 11/27/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
This appeal asked whether the State may charge multiple acts of misdemeanor retail theft under §943.50 as one felony under §971.36(3)(a). The justices split 3-2-2. Five of them answered “yes,” but did not fully agree on a rationale for that mandate. The justices also disagreed over the role titles play in statutory construction and over whether both appellants in a consolidated appeal must file a petition for review.
SCOW: waiver in any county means adult jurisdiction in every county
State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)
We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?
In case of first impression, SCOW upholds search pursuant to Act 79
State v. Roy S. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 11/15/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Act 79 permits law enforcement to search a person on probation, parole or extended supervision based on reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) that the person, is is about to, or has committed a violation of a condition of his release. In its first decision on this law, SCOW holds 7-0 that the officer here had (a) knowledge of Anderson’s supervision status before conducting the search at issue, and (b) the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct the search.
Defense win! SCOW reverses courts of appeals’ dismissal of Chapter 51 appeal for mootness
Waukesha County v. J.K., 2018AP616-NM, 9/3/19 (unpublished order); case activity
The court of appeals can be pretty aggressive about dismissing Chapter 51 appeals for mootness. This time SCOW slapped its hand. J.K.’s lawyer filed a no-merit notice of appeal. Before appointed counsel could file a no-merit report, and before J.K. could respond to any such report, the court of appeals (D2) dismissed the appeal as moot because the commitment order at issue had expired and J.K. was under a new commitment order.
SCOW: Driver can’t revoke consent to test of validly drawn blood sample
State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.
SCOW: professional misconduct warranting suspension does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel
State v. Tyrus Lee Cooper, 2016AP375-CR, 6/20/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)
Cooper moved for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal and filed an OLR grievance because his lawyer failed to provide him with discovery, contact witnesses, and communicate with him. Days before trial, his unprepared lawyer misled him about the strength of the State’s case and rushed him into a plea. The circuit court denied Cooper’s motion, but OLR later concluded that the lawyer committed 19 acts of misconduct, 5 directly relating to Cooper’s plea. Consequently, SCOW suspended his license. Now, in 4-3 decision SCOW holds that the lawyer’s professional misconduct does not satisfy the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defense win! SCOW declares 971.14’s treatment to competency provisions unconstitutional
State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm. The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.
SCOW splits 3-3 over how to trigger an automatic stay of an involuntary medication order pending appeal
State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Milw. County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19, case activity
A defendant is entitled to an automatic stay of an involuntary medication pending appeal, otherwise his liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications is rendered a nullity. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, __Wis. 2d __, 912 N.W.2d 14. But what triggers the automatic stay–the entry of the involuntary medication order itself or the filing of the notice of appeal? SCOW split 3-3 on this issue (Abrahamson did not participate), so the court of appeals decision stands.