On Point blog, page 17 of 104
SCOW suspends defense lawyer for lying and forging a court order
OLR v. Michael D. Petersen, 2016AP563-D, 12/15/17 (case activity )
I am a crook. I am a cheat. I am a thief. I am a liar. I was convicted of a crime on November 9th, 2015. My conviction resulted from my intentional choice to sell my own clients down the river and then trying to cover it up. You may not hire me or have me legally represent you in any fashion until you read the Criminal Complaint and Judgment of Conviction in my Outagamie County Wisconsin Case No. 15CM878. This disclosure is required as one of the conditions of my probation. Op. ¶34
Do we have your attention?
SCOW ducks First Amendment question
State v. Ginger Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, 12/1/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Breitzman was convicted at trial of several counts of child abuse (for physical assaults) and neglect of her son, J.K. She was also convicted of a charge of disorderly conduct for an incident inside their home in which she called him a “fuck face,” a “retard,” and a “piece of shit.” The lead issue is whether her trial lawyer was ineffective for not trying to get the DC dismissed because her words were protected by the First Amendment. The court refuses to decide.
SCOW issues defense win! Deputy misrepresented the consequences of refusing to submit to blood test
Jeremy Perri guests posts on State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, 7/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94; case activity (including briefs)
SCOW suppresses blood test, holding that the statutory Informing the Accused misrepresented the consequences of a refusal, the consent was coerced, and the exclusionary rule is necessary to deter future violations.
SCOW upholds consent search after traffic stop; dissent criticizes “trajectory” of 4th Amendment decisions
Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)
The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.
SCOW fractures over implied consent law; 3 justices say it doesn’t authorize warrantless blood draws
State v. Navdeep S. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 7/6/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP1261-CR; case activity (including briefs)
By obtaining a driver’s license or operating a vehicle in Wisconsin do we automatically give the government consent to draw our blood without a warrant? A nose count reveals the answer remains “maybe.”
SCOW: “Standard criteria” not required for vehicle impound
State v. Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 2017 WI 76, 7/6/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
This case presented an issue that has divided federal and state appellate courts: does Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), permit “community caretaker”-type vehicle impoundments only when the police act accord to “standard criteria”? The majority in this case joins the “no” camp; the dissent says the majority has “buck[ed] the nationwide trend” and expanded the community caretaker doctrine into a “pretext to engage in unconstitutional searches” for evidence of crime.
SCOW finds no problem with felony and misdemeanor penalty for same OAR offense
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.
Et tu, Bruton? SCOW says Confrontation Clause doesn’t bar admission of co-defendant’s inculpatory statements to fellow inmate
State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 6/29/17, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014AP1623-CR; case activity (including briefs)
Forget the old saws that “appellate courts decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds,” “appellate courts should not reach constitutional issues when another issue is dispositive,” and “the supreme court should not decide issues forfeited in the court of appeals.” They don’t constrain SCOW here. Indeed, the majority opinion rushes past the plain language of §971.12(3) in order to decide a major Confrontation Clause issue and to reverse a big defense win in the court of appeals.
SCOW clarifies subpoena requirements for criminal cases
State v. Keimonte Antoine Wilson, Sr., 2017 WI 63, 6/22/17, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court holds that the provisions of § 885.03 govern service of a subpoenas in criminal cases, not the provisions of § 805.07.
SCOW: Expunction requires perfect conduct on probation, maybe?
State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?