On Point blog, page 27 of 104

SCOW toughens standards for 974.06 postconviction motions and 971.08(2) plea withdrawal motions

State v. Andres Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; majority opinion by Justice Prosser, dissenting opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Oliver Wendell Holmes said “hard cases make bad law.”  This decision proves that simple cases can too.  If you thought winning a §974.06 postconviction motion or a § 971.08(2) motion for plea withdrawal due to the trial court’s failure to give deportation warnings was tough before, wait until you read this decision.

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SCOW: Court’s failure to specify crime for which probable cause found didn’t invalidate bindover of juvenile charged in adult court

State v. Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

When a juvenile is charged with a crime that gives the criminal court exclusive original jurisdiction, § 970.032(1) expressly requires the judge conducting the preliminary hearing to find probable cause for the specific felony that gives the court jurisdiction. In this case the supreme court addresses what happens when the trial judge doesn’t follow the statute’s clear mandate. On Point asked Eileen Hirsch, an attorney with the SPD’s Madison Appellate Office and all-around juvenile law guru, to discuss the decision. Here’s her take:

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SCOW “elaborates” and alters test for getting in camera review of confidential informant

State v. Jessica A. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 7/23/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Under the two-step procedure for determining whether a confidential informant’s identity should be disclosed, a court must first determine whether there is reason to believe that the informant “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” If so, the court must determine (usually after an in camera examination of either affidavits or the informant) whether “there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony.” § 905.10(3)(b); State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 124-26, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982). In this case, the supreme court elaborates on what a defendant must show to satisfy the first step, concludes that the required showing is “a reasonable possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense” (¶2), and applies the test in a way that ultimately collapses the previous two-step procedure into a single step.

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SCOW: Circuit court properly excluded evidence of prior sexual activity under rape shield law

State v. Muhammad Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 7/22/14, reversing a published court of appeals opinion; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The supreme court holds the circuit court incorrectly concluded that evidence of prior sexual activity between Sarfraz and I.N., the complainant in his sexual assault prosecution, was not relevant to a material fact in the case, but correctly concluded that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to the complainant. Thus, the evidence was properly excluded.

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SCOW: Violation of right to public trial is forfeited if defendant doesn’t object

State v. Nancy J. Pinno & State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2014 WI 74, 7/18/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders denying postconviction relief; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity: Pinno; Seaton

Deciding an issue left open by State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶34-38, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, the supreme court rejects the argument that the right to a public trial must be affirmatively and knowingly waived by the defendant. Instead, the court holds, “[a] defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as the defendant is aware that the judge excluded the public from the courtroom.” (¶7).

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SCOW: Officer’s rapping on driver’s window wasn’t a seizure

County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 7/18/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

“Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we conclude that a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave.” (¶3).

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SCOW: Denial of defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis

State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.

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SCOW: Stop and search of car based on officer’s misunderstanding of tail lamp statute violates 4th Amendment

State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Another defense victory!  Police stopped  Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.”  In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal.  Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.

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SCOW: Trial court’s erroneous dismissal of NGI defense was harmless

State v. Erick O. Magett, 2014 WI 67, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

The circuit court erred when it prevented Magett from testifying on the issue of mental disease or defect during the responsibility phase of his NGI trial because the court mistakenly believed that Magett was not a competent witness regarding his own mental condition and that he was required to present expert testimony on the issue. The circuit court also erred in dismissing Magett’s NGI defense without hearing any testimony during the responsiblity phase. However, a majority of the supreme court holds these errors are harmless, so Magett does not get a new hearing on the issue of mental responsibility.

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SCOW: Reversal of predicate sexually violent offense doesn’t require dismissal of pending ch. 980 petition

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2014 WI 71, 7/16/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and reversing the circuit court’s dismissal order; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

A necessary predicate of a commitment under ch. 980 is a conviction for a sexually violent offense. This case raises an unusual issue regarding predicate convictions: Can the state continue to prosecute a ch. 980 proceeding if the predicate conviction that was alleged in the petition is vacated and dismissed after the petition is filed? The supreme court answers “yes,” holding that the sufficiency of a ch. 980 petition is to be assessed as of the time it is filed, and at the time the petition in this case was filed there was a valid conviction for the predicate offense.

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