On Point: B. Opinions

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.

State v. Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 WI 57, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 7/11/14; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Why tackle thorny legal issues surrounding Wis. Stat. §343.303’s prohibition against the use of PBTs at OWI trials when you can decide the case on harmless error grounds?  In this case, the PBT was ordered and administered by ER staff, not law enforcement. SCOW gets to pick and choose its cases. So when it grants review, the parties, their lawyers, the lower courts, and the bar hope the court will decide the legal issues, not re-review the evidence presented to the jury.  This fractured decision deserves a close look in order to understand what has and has not been decided about the use of PBTs in OWI trials.

State v. William F. Bokenyi, 2014 WI 61, 7/11/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

In a decision that plows no new legal ground, a divided supreme court holds that a prosecutor’s remarks at sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, but were instead within the proper bounds of argument in support of a permitted recommendation for imprisonment. Because the prosecutor didn’t breach the plea agreement, the court doesn’t decide the primary issue presented for review: Whether the court should overrule State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 683 N.W.2d 522, which held that if defense counsel does not consult with the defendant when foregoing an objection to a breach of the plea agreement, counsel performs deficiently because that is “tantamount to entering a renegotiated plea agreement without [the defendant’s] knowledge or consent.”

State v. Jimothy A. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 7/11/14, review of an per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by C.J. Abrahamson; case activity

This is a very nice victory for the defense.  It clarifies the “prejudice” showing required for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  And it assures lower courts that, where trial counsel fails to call an eyewitness whose credibility can be challenged, it is still quite possible to show the prejudice required for a new trial.  After all, witness credibility is for the jury to decide.

State v. Derik J. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 7/11/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

A four-justice majority of the supreme court holds that a police officer lawfully searched a briefcase found in a vehicle during a traffic stop because the driver consented to a search of the car and the passenger did not unequivocally withdraw the consent given by the driver. Three dissenting judges take a very different view, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer should have realized that Wantland was withdrawing consent to a search of the briefcase.

State v. Rafeal Lyfold Myrick, 2014 WI 55, 7/10/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

When does negotiation become agreement? In State v. Myrick, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s resolution of this question was critical in determining whether the State could use incriminating statements that the defendant had made at a co-defendant’s preliminary hearing. The issue arose because the plea negotiations (one theory) or the plea agreement (alternate theory) fell apart, leading to the defendant’s trial on the original homicide charge.  On Point’s Special Guest Michael Tobin, Deputy SPD, offers his take on the issues.

 State v. O’Brien, et al., 2014 WI 54, 7/9/14, affirming published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

The defendants challenged the constitutionality of recently enacted WI Stat. s. 970.038, which permits the use of hearsay at preliminary hearings, and allows a court to base a finding – that probable cause exists to hold a defendant for trial on a felony charge – entirely on hearsay. The Wisconsin Supreme Court cursorily rejected arguments that the new statute, as applied, violated their rights to confrontation, compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel and due process. Special Guest Marla Stephens, Director of the SPD’s Appellate Division, authored this post about the decision.

State ex re. Lorenzo D. Kyles v. William Pollard, 2013 WI 38, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Settling a somewhat obscure but still important point of appellate procedure, the supreme court unanimously holds that when a defendant seeks to reinstate the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under § 809.30(2)(b) based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice, he should file a habeas petition in the court of appeals as provided under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).

State v. Jacqueline Robinson, 2014 WI 35, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

From the majority opinion, this looks like an open and shut case. When sentencing Robinson, the trial judge said he misunderstood the sentence she had received in another matter. One day later, he recalled the case and increased the sentence. No double jeopardy violation here, says the majority, Robinson could not yet have had a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence. The 28-page concurrence and 20-page dissent suggest this case isn’t so simple.

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Peter J. Thompson, 2014 WI 25; case activity

The supreme court rejects OLR’s attempt to discipline a lawyer who disclosed confidential client information in advance of a Machner hearing, finding the context in which the disclosure was made to be “of critical importance” to its determination (¶26) while also reminding lawyers to “proceed with caution when considering disclosure of confidential client information in response to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” (¶1).