On Point blog, page 33 of 104
Criminal convictions – collateral consequences
Jamerson v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 2013 WI 7
Wisconsin supreme court decision, affirming 2012 WI App 32, 340 Wis. 2d 215, 813 N.W.2d 221
This case is not directly applicable to SPD practice, but it is a useful reminder of the multitudinous collateral consequences that may attend a criminal conviction. Here’s the gist:
¶2 The new [2009] caregiver law [relating to child care licenses] imposes a lifetime ban on licensure,
Involuntary Statement – Coercion
State v. Dennis D. Lemoine, 2013 WI 5, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Lemoine’s inculpatory statement to the police was voluntary:
¶3 We hold that the admission of Lemoine’s statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. The well-established test for voluntariness balances the personal characteristics of the defendant against pressures imposed by law enforcement officers to determine if the pressures exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.
Supreme Court Justice Recusal
Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 104 (Justice Gableman); case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 103; 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43
¶1 On May 8, 2012, I received a letter from Kevin P. Reak, counsel for Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., filed with the court, requesting that I recuse myself from participation in the captioned matter.
Supreme Court Justice Recusal – Material Witness
Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 103 (Justice Ziegler); case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43
Justice Ziegler, like Justice Roggensack and unlike Justice Crooks, recuses herself from a pending judicial complaint against Justice Prosser.
¶2 The highly unusual issue each justice is called upon to decide is whether he or she,
Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge; Read-In Procedure: Dismissed Charges, Distinguished
State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity
Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge
The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)
¶47 To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,
Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Suspect’s Initiation of Contact; Binding Authority – Overruled Court of Appeals Decision
State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity
Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect
Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived.
Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”; Harmless Error
State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity
Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”
Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,
“Evans-Thompson” Immunity – Derivative Use
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity
Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.
¶3 We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent. Thus,
Guilty Plea Procedure – Defendant’s Personal Presence
State v. Jon Anthony Soto, 2012 WI 93, on certification; case activity
A guilty plea defendant has a statutory right under § 971.04(1)(g) to be present in court when the plea is accepted and judgment pronounced, but the right may be waived (as distinguished from forfeited), as it was here.
¶2 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held,
Motion to withdraw Plea – Deportation Consequences, § 971.08(2) – Pleading Requirements
State v. Abraham C. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, affirming summary order; case activity
Negrete’s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty plea, on the ground that he wasn’t personally advised of deportation consequences, § 971.08(2), was denied by the circuit court without a hearing. The court upholds that result:
¶2 In support of his motion, Negrete stated in an affidavit that he “do[es] not recall”