On Point: B. Opinions

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” 

State v. Harry Thompson, 2012 WI 90, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Section 970.02(1)(a) imposes several mandatory duties at initial appearance: the judge must inform the defendant of the charge, furnish him with a copy of the complaint, and personally inform him of the penalties for any felonies in the charge; and, the complaint must set forth the possible penalties, ¶62. These obligations apply to any offense in the complaint carrying a mandatory minimum sentence, 

State v. Circuit Court for Dane County / Ismael R. Ozanne v. Jeff Fitzgerald, 2012 WI 82, declining to grant motion to reopen 2011 WI 43; case activity; companion case: Adams v. State, 2012 WI 81

The court splits 3-3 on, and therefore does not grant, District Attorney Ozanne’s motion to reopen the decision in 2011 WI 43 (the Act 10,

State v. Scott E. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, on certification; case activity

Interfering with Child Custody, § 948.31(2) – Elements

Language in State v. Bowden, 2007 WI App 234, ¶18, 306 Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, that one method of violating § 948.31(2) (interference with child custody) requires the parent’s “initial permission” to take child, is now “withdrawn”:

¶52  Pursuant to the plain language of Wis.

State v. Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr. / State v. Price T. Hunt, 2012 WI 72, affirming 2011 WI App 61; case activity (Gilbert), case activity (Hunt)

¶2   We are asked to decide whether Wisconsin Statutes chapter 980 (2005-06)[3] requires the dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition is re-incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or extended supervision.  

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 69 (Justice Crooks); case activity; companion decision: 2012 WI 43

Justice Crooks declines to recuse himself (with respect to the pending misconduct complaint against Justice Prosser) under the Rule of Necessity, namely the possible loss of a quorum (4 justices) and thus loss of ability altogether to resolve the matter:

This matter——involving discipline of a sitting Supreme Court justice arising from incidents with sitting justices that were witnessed by other sitting justices——places this court in a difficult position.

State v. Lee Roy Cain, 2012 WI 68, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Post-Sentencing Plea-Withdrawal, Generally 

When a defendant satisfies the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a “manifest injustice,” the plea should be withdrawn as a matter of right:

¶26  …  State v. Daley sets out the following list of circumstances where manifest injustice occurs:[6]

1.

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, on bypass; case activity

¶1   Once again this court is asked to interpret the Wisconsin Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39 (2009-10).[1]  The issue presented is whether an authority[2] may impose a fee on a requester of a public record for the actual, necessary, and direct costs incurred by the authority (including staff time) of deleting nondisclosable information included within the responsive records.

State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, reversing 2011 WI App 118; case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Authority to Litigate Constitutionality of Traffic Stop 

Constitutionality of the traffic stop  may be raised as a defense at a refusal hearing, § 343.305(9)(a)5.a.

¶29  In this case, the relevant portion of the statute is found in sub. (9)(a)5.a.  That subsection permits circuit courts to consider “[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol . 

State v. Joseph C. Miller, 2012 WI 61, affirming summary order; case activity

¶5   We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.”[5]  We are confident that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of the final informant and the information provided by him.