On Point: B. Opinions

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E. F., 2012 WI 50, affirming 2011 WI App 72; for Helen E.F.: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Someone suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease is not a fit subject for commitment under ch. 51 but, instead, guardianship proceedings under ch. 55.

¶13  Wis. Stat. ch. 55 provides Helen with the best means of care.  

Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 2012 WI 44; case activity

¶37 n. [11]:

In State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, this court recognized that the terms “forfeiture” and “waiver” are often used interchangeably, but that the terms embody distinct legal concepts.  Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 43 (Justice Roggensack); case activity

¶1   On April 17, 2012, Justice David T. Prosser’s Attorney, Kevin P. Reak, wrote and asked me to disqualify myself from participation in the above-captioned matter, asserting that I am a material witness. …

¶2   … I conclude that I am disqualified by law from participating in the above-captioned proceeding.  

State v. Devin W. Felix, 2012 WI 36, reversing unpublished decision; for Felix: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), warrantless arrest following nonconsensual entry of a home is illegal unless supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. However, New York v. Harris,

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Company, 2012 WI 26; case activity

¶32  … The word “may” is ordinarily used to grant permission or to indicate possibility.  See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1112 (3d ed. 1992).  Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we generally construe the word “may” as permissive.  Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 78 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 254 N.W.2d 230 (1977); 

Admiral Insurance Company v. Paper Converting Machine Co., 2012 WI 30; case activity

¶3   If we conclude that there is any ambiguity in an order or judgment about whether it disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, we will construe the ambiguity so as to preserve the right to appeal. …

…

¶26  We recently addressed what it means for a judgment or order to be final in Wambolt v.

State v. William Dinkins, Sr., 2012 WI 24, affirming 2010 WI App 163; for Dinkins: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; note: the court affirms the mandate (reversal of conviction and dismissal of charge), but “upon a different rationale,” ¶63; the net effect is, “affirmed, as modified“

Although homelessness is not in and of itself a defense to prosecution for failing to register as a sex offender, 

State v. Jeffery G. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, reversing summary order of court of appeals; for Sutton: Kaitlin A. Lamb, Colleen Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate;  for amicus, WACDL: Robert R. Henak; case activity

Although presented with an unpreserved but seemingly meritorious issue (defective jury-waiver colloquy) on § 809.32 no-merit review, the court of appeals nonetheless accepted counsel’s no-merit report, thereby affirming Sutton’s conviction, and instructed him to seek relief pursuant to § 974.06 even though he was no longer in custody and the remedy was thus illusory.

State v. Basil E. Ryan, Jr., 2012 WI 16, reversing 2011 WI App 21; case activity

¶32  We begin by addressing the circuit court’s application of the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Judicial estoppel is intended “to protect against a litigant playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ by asserting inconsistent positions” in different legal proceedings. State v. Petty,

State v. Carl L. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, affirming 2010 WI App 58; for Dowdy: Bryan J. Cahill; Amicus: Dustin Haskell (SPD), Robert Henak (WACDL); case activity

¶4   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does not grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation.  Rather, the plain language of § 973.09(3)(a) grants a circuit court authority only to “extend probation for a stated period”