On Point: B. Opinions

Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, on certification; for Jacob T.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(6) – “Substantial Parental Relationship”

¶22  The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. 

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,

State v. Shantell T. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, affirming unpublished decision; for Harbor: Joseph E. Redding; case activity

Sentence Modification – New Factor

The “new factor” test for sentence modification has split into “two divergent lines of cases”: Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (fact(s) highly relevant to, but not brought out at, 

State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, affirming 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Confrontation – Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶34  We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. 

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.

State v. Alan Keith Burns, 2011 WI 22, affirming unpublished decision; for Burns: David R. Karpe; case activity

The court rejects Burns’s claim for a new trial in the interest of justice premised on three grounds: 1. Burns was unable to cross-examine the complainant on her implication that he took her virginity; 2. evidence of prior sexual assaults of the complainant by his father,

State v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr., 2011 WI 12, reversing unpublished decision; case activity; prior post; for Marinez: Ralph J. Sczygelski

Evidence – Other-Acts, § 904.04(2) – “Sullivan” Analysis

¶19  To guide courts in determining whether other-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), we developed a three-prong test.  Sullivan,

Evelyn Werner v. Kenneth Hendree, 2011 WI 10, reversing 2009 WI App 103; case activity

Appellate Procedure – Finality and Appealability

A circuit court order rejecting state indemnification of an employee being sued was non-final and thus absorbed in the final judgment later entered as to liability and damages.

¶62  An appeal may be taken as a matter of right only from a final judgment or a final order. 

State v. Janet A. Conner, 2011 WI 8, affirming 2009 WI App 143; for Conner: Stephen E. Mays; case activity; Conner BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Stalking, § 940.32 – Notice of Charge, “Course of Conduct”

Stalking requires proof of, among other elements, a “course of conduct” which “means a series of 2 or more acts carried out over time,

Brown County Dept. of Human Services v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, affirming unpublished decision; for Brenda B.: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

¶3   Given that a finding of parental unfitness does not necessarily result in an involuntary termination of parental rights, we determine that the circuit court was not obligated to inform Brenda that by pleading no contest she was waiving her constitutional right to parent.