On Point blog, page 2 of 2
SCOW will address whether mandatory DNA surcharge violates ex post facto clause
State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. Is the imposition of a single mandatory $250 DNA surcharge an ex post facto violation with respect to a defendant who committed his offense when the surcharge was discretionary and who previously had provided a DNA sample in another case?
2. Is Jamal Williams entitled to resentencing because the circuit court sentenced him based on an improper factor, namely, the fact that Williams refused to stipulate to restitution for which he was not legally responsible?
SCOW to review IAC, sentencing, and cross-appeal issues
State v. Anthony R. Pico, 2015AP1799-CR, petition for review granted 10/10/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point):
1. Did the Court of Appeals apply the proper standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact regarding trial counsel’s conduct and strategy?
2. Did trial counsel perform deficiently by failing to investigate Pico’s serious head injury, and did that deficient performance prejudice Pico in pretrial proceedings and at trial?
3. Did the sentencing court impermissibly burden Pico’s privilege against self-incrimination?
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that Pico waived issues not raised by cross-appeal?
5. Is it permissible for a postconviction court to admit and consider expert testimony by another criminal defense attorney regarding the conduct of trial counsel?
SCOW to address whether warrantless blood draw of unconscious motorist violates 4th Amendment
State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.
SCOW to address claim for a new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence
State v. David McAlister, Sr., 2014AP2561, petition granted 9/11/17; affirmed 4/18/18; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (copied from petition for review)
1. The central issue at trial was whether McAlister participated in the charged robberies. The state’s evidence on that point consisted entirely of the allegations of two confessed participants seeking to mitigate the consequences of their own misconduct. The jury knew that the state’s witnesses had a motive to falsely accuse McAlister but those witnesses denied under oath having done so. Under these circumstances, is newly discovered evidence from three separate witnesses swearing that the state’s witnesses admitted prior to trial that they intended to falsely accuse McAlister “cumulative” and “merely tend to impeach the credibility of witnesses” such that it could not support a newly discovered evidence claim?
2. Whether the allegations of McAlister’s §974.06 motion were sufficient to require a new trial and therefore an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
SCOW to review involuntary treatment to competency on appeal
State v. Andre L. Scott, 2016AP2017-CR, bypass granted 9/12/17, case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
1. Whether, despite State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), a circuit court may use §971.14(4)(b) to require a nondangerous defendant to be treated to competency against his will, and if so, whether §971.14(4)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not comport with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
2. Whether an order requiring an inmate to be involuntarily treated to competency is a nonfinal order that should be challenged by a Wis. Stat. §809.50 petition for interlocutory appeal or a final order of a special proceeding that is appealable as a matter of right via Wis. Stat. §808.03(1).
3. Whether the court of appeals exercises its discretion erroneously when it denies a motion for relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning.
SCOW to address whether courts must advise defendant of multiple DNA surcharges prior to plea
State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR, certification granted 9/12/17; case activity (including briefs). This is the second certification of this case; here’s the first.
Issue
In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?
If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?
We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.
We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNA surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.