On Point blog, page 2 of 5
SCOW invalidates Wisconsin statute governing coordination between candidates and certain independent groups; halts John Doe probe based on alleged violations of the law
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson et al.; State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz v. the Honorable Gregory Peterson, & State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson, et al., 2015 WI 85, issued 7/16/15; case activity: Two Unnamed Petitioners; Schmitz v. Peterson; Three Unnamed Petitioners
Unless you’ve just returned from a trip to a remote corner of the globe that’s beyond the reach of news media, you know by now that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the so-called “John Doe” cases. The court’s decision ordered a halt into the investigation of coordinated fundraising and spending between candidate committees and certain independent groups during the 2011-12 recall campaigns. Gargantuan by any standard, the decision goes on for almost 400 pages, with a majority opinion, two concurrences (Prosser and Ziegler), and two dissents/concurrences (Abrahamson and Crooks). It contains almost nothing of relevance to ordinary criminal law practice. However, in the interest of helping orient readers who may want to look more closely at the decision, below the break is a summary of the major issues and how the various opinions address them.
SCOW: Defendants can’t rely on DOC’s discharge certificate and repeated assurances that probation has ended
State ex rel. Ardonis Greer v. Wayne J. Widenhoeft, 2014 WI 19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity; Majority opinion: Justice Ziegler; Dissent: Justice Bradley and C.J. Abrahamson
The DOC assured Greer his probation was over and issued a discharge certificate to that effect. In truth, his probation term hadn’t yet expired. So when he committed new crimes, the DOC revoked his probation. The Majority rejects Greer’s claims that the DOC: (1) lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation, (2) denied due process, and (3) is subject to equitable estoppel.
Court of appeals bungles denial of motion for reconsideration of decision on petition for writ coram nobis
Sawyer County v. Maurice J. Corbin, 2013AP650; 1/22/14; District 3 (one-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
This is an odd little case with some interesting potential. In 2004, Corbine was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a chemical blood test under implied consent law. Supposedly Corbine received a “notice of intent to revoke operating privilege” but failed to request a refusal hearing, so the court entered default judgment revoking his license.
Counsel: Sanctions – Pre-Litigation Advice
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2012 WI App 120(recommended for publication); case activity
A court doesn’t possess inherent authority to impose on counsel a sanction (here, monetary) for pre-litigation advice, that is, conduct occurring before the court’s jurisdiction was invoked:
¶3 We conclude that the record, particularly the trial court’s own words in its ruling, clearly shows that the trial court imposed the sanction for pre-litigation legal advice that the trial court believed Godfrey &
Probation: DOC Discharge Certificate (§ 973.09(5)) Wrongly Issued, Prior to Expiration of Term; Certiorari Review: Equitable Estoppel Inapplicable
Ardonis Greer v. David H. Schwarz, 2012 WI App 122, petition for review granted 6/12/13, affirmed, 2014 WI 19; case activity
DOC Discharge Certificate (Probation, § 973.09(5)) – Wrongly Issued, Prior to Expiration of Term of Probation
As a function of “administrative error,” the department of corrections issued Greer a discharge certificate before his term of probation had expired.
Coram Nobis: “Very Limited Scope”
Chintan V. Patel v. State of Wisconsin, 2012 WI App 117 (recommended for publication); case activity
¶12 In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Patel’s writ of coram nobis. The writ of coram nobis is a discretionary writ of “very limited scope” that is “addressed to the trial court.” Jessen v. State,
Juvenile Delinquency Disposition – Expelled Student; Supervisory Writs; Statutory Construction Principle – Titles
Madison Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2011 WI 72, affirming summary order; case activity
Juvenile Delinquency Disposition – Expelled Student
A juvenile delinquency court lacks authority to order a school district to provide educational services to a delinquent whom the district has expelled.
¶5 We conclude:
…
(2) A circuit court does not have statutory authority to order a school district to provide alternative educational services to a juvenile who has been expelled from school by a lawful and unchallenged expulsion order but is still residing in the community.
Prison Discipline: Certiorari Review – Right to Exculpatory Material – Impartial Fact-Finder
Darnell Jackson v. Buchler, 2010 WI 135, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision; for Jackson: Michael Halfenger, et al.; Jackson BiC; Buchler Resp.; Reply; Jackson Br. after remand; Buchler Br. after remand
Certiorari Review – Prison Discipline
Evidence before disciplinary committee, in the form of statements of two confidential informants,
Coram Nobis
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2010AP1469, District 4, 10/28/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se
Following earlier unsuccessful challenges to his plea-based conviction via direct appeal and habeas, Obriecht utilizes coram nobis as an attack mechanism. He argues that his plea wasn’t knowing, and that requiring a plea as a precondition to participation in the First Offender Program violated due process. The court rejects the arguments because they don’t relate to factual error unknown at the time,
Mandamus – Generally; John Doe Procedure – Generally – Judicial Screening; Statutory Construction
Hakim Naseer v. Circuit Court for Grant County, 2010 WI App 142; pro se
Mandamus – Generally
¶4 A supervisory writ of mandamus is a mechanism by which a court may compel a public official to perform a legally obligated act. State ex rel. Robins v. Madden, 2009 WI 46, ¶10, 317 Wis. 2d 364, 766 N.W.2d 542. Because a supervisory writ “invokes our supervisory authority,