On Point

State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?

United States v. Cooley, USSC No. 19-1414, 2021 WL 2194835, 6/1/21, vacating 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019)

Cooley’s truck, parked on the side of a US highway running through the Crow Reservation in Montana, attracted the attention of a Crow Police Department officer. The officer said that when he approached the truck, he found Cooley “appeared to be non-native” and showed signs of intoxication; he also had two semiautomatic rifles on his front seat. The officer eventually ordered Cooley out of the truck and patted him down; eventually he would discover methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the vehicle.

State v. Heather Van Beek, 2021 WI 51, 2019AP447-CR, on certification from the court of appeals, 6/4/21; case activity (including briefs)

In a splintered opinion, a majority of SCOW holds that an officer does not necessarily “seize” a driver when he takes her license to run a records check. Seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances. In this case, a seizure occured when the officer continued holding a license and questioning the driver until a drug-sniff dog arrived. And the seizure was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Roggensack wrote the majority opinion. The liberals joined some parts of it, and the remaining conservatives joined other parts.

State v. James Timothy Genous, 2021WI 50, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2019AP435-CR, 6/4/21; case activity (including briefs)

An officer saw Genous sit in a parked car, engine running and headlights on, in a residential neighborhood at 3:36 a.m.  A woman emerged from a house, entered the car for 10 to 15 seconds, and returned to the house.  Although the officer could not see what happened inside the car, the woman appeared to match the description of a female drug user who was known to live in the house. Plus the officer had heard that this area had a reputation for drug trafficking. In a 4-3 opinion, SCOW held that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop Genous for possible drug dealing.

Justice R.G. Bradley seems bent on challenging Justice Abrahamson’s status as SCOW’s dissenter in chief. She has begun matching Abrahamson’s rate of dissent (even while conservatives hold the majority on SCOW). But to reach Abrahamson’s total she will have to keep getting re-elected. Read more on SCOWstats.

On May 26, 2021, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal law related opinions:

State v. Keandrae J. Reed, 2020AP1921-CR, District 1, 6/2/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After being convicted of misdemeanor theft, Reed was placed on probation and given the chance for expungement. While he successfully discharged from probation, he isn’t entitled to expungement because he didn’t do enough to pay restitution to have “successfully completed” his sentence as required by § 973.015(1m)(b).

United States v. Palomar-Santiago, USSC No. 20-437, May 24, 2021, reversing  and remanding 813 Fed. Appx. 282 (9th Cir. 2020); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary) Under 8 U.S.C. §1326(d), a person removed from the U.S. for a criminal conviction and then charged with illegally reentering the country may collaterally attack the removal […]

Edwards v. Vannoy, USSC No. 19-5807, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (May 17, 2021), affirming 2019 WL 8643258 (5th Cir. May 20, 2019) (denying certificate of appealability); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision alters the long-standing doctrine for deciding whether new rules of criminal procedure established by a decision of the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases that are final and, therefore, require the defendant to seek collateral review of his or her conviction. The result is that new rules of criminal procedure will no more forever apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.

State v. Billy Joe Cannon, 2019AP2296-CR, District 1, 5/25/21 (not recommended for publication; case activity (including briefs)

In 2009, the State charged Cannon with conspiracy to deliver cocaine on Nov. 10, 2005. In 2011, a jury acquitted him. Six weeks later, the State filed new charges alleging that Cannon conspired to deliver cocaine on March 4, 2008 through March 24, 2008. This time, a jury found him guilty. On appeal, Cannon argued that the 2009 and 2011 conspiracy charges concerned a single, continuous conspiracy so the second prosecution violated his to be free from double jeopardy. He also argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress wiretap recordings. The court of appeals rejected both claims.