On Point

The Supreme Court’s most recent orders list denied cert in a whole lot of cases; one of those denials drew a written dissent from Justice Sotomayor. She would have granted certiorari and summarily reversed an Eighth Circuit decision denying habeas relief to the defendant.

State v. Wilson P. Anderson, 2020AP819-Cr, 3/16/21, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A few weeks ago, District 4 issued a to-be-published decision regarding the State’s burden of proof on a motion for involuntary medication to restore a defendant’s competence for trial. See State v. Green. It held that to satisfy Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the State must file an individualized treatment plan specifying the medications and dosages it wants to administer to the defendant, and the circuit court must approve it. In Anderson’s case, District 1 holds that the State can file a psychologist’s report that simply indicates the defendant’s diagnosis, treatment history, and a need for medication (without specifying drugs, dosages, etc.). District 1’s decision in Anderson seems oblivious to, and contradicts, Green and a new District 4 decision in State v. Engen as well as Sell itself and substantial federal case law.

State v. Eric Engen, 2020AP160-CR, 3/18/21, District 4, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is the third court of appeals decision on Sell v. United States in three weeks. As in State v. Green, District 4 here again holds that the State must file an individualized treatment plan to support a motion for involuntary medication to restore a defendant’s competence for trial. A psychiatrist’s report simply opining that medication is necessary to restore competency does not satisfy Sell. Green and Engen conflict with District 1’s decision this week in State v. Anderson, which holds that a report by a psychologist (who cannot prescribe medication) simply opining that the defendant needs medication to regain competence, satisfies Sell. The Engen decision is important for several other reasons as well.

State v. Robert Daris Spencer, 2018AP942-CR, District 1, 3/9/21 (not recommended for publication), petition and cross petition for review both granted 8/13/21, affirmed in part, reversed in part, 2022 WI 56; case activity (including briefs)

Spencer challenges the trial court’s decision to dismiss a juror for cause just before deliberations began, but over a dissent the court of appeals holds his claims are forfeited or that any error was harmless. However, Spencer is entitled to a Machner hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay evidence.

State v. Theophilous Ruffin, 2019AP1046-CR, District 1, 3/9/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/17/21; reversed, 2022 WI 34; case activity (including briefs)

Ruffin raises three challenges to how the jury was instructed at his trial. Two are rejected in all respects, but one—regarding trial counsel’s decision to withdraw a self defense instruction—gets him a Machner hearing.

City of Cedarburg v. Katherine D. Young, 2020AP1848, District 2, 3/17/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Young was prosecuted for an OWI 1st offense that did not arise out of a traffic stop or involve police collecting blood or breath samples or even testifying at trial. Can that be done? Sure, it can. And the evidence that was presented at trial was sufficient to convict her, too.

State v. Anthony James Jendusa, 2021 WI 24, affirming a court of appeals order denying interlocutory appeal; case activity (including briefs)

This litigation has been procedurally weird, as we’ve discussed before, but SCOW’s decision on the merits may turn out to be a momentous one for the future of ch. 980.

State v. Kenyon D. Grant, 2020AP785, 3/9/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) held that trial counsel cannot concede guilt over his client’s express objection. This would deny the client his 6th Amendment right to determine the objective of his defense and require an automatic new trial. Grant raised a McCoy claim in this case. It failed because trial counsel testified that Grant did not oppose his concession strategy and objected only after hearing the State’s evidence against him.

The moment Chapter 51 lawyers have been waiting for has . . . been postponed.  This term SCOW was set to decide whether appeals from expired recommitment orders are ever moot. See our post on Portage County v. E.R.R., 2019AP20133. After briefing and oral argument (in which Justice Anne Walsh Bradley did not participate), SCOW split 3-3 on the issue.  This means that the order dismissing E.R.R.’s appeal as moot stands. That’s the bad news.  Here’s the good news.

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.