On Point

State v. Chidiebele Praises Ozodi, 2019AP886-CR, District 2, 12/16/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The legislature amended § 939.42 in 2013 Wis. Act 307 to eliminate the defense of voluntary intoxication when the intoxication negated the existence of a requisite mental state, like intent or knowledge. But because the state has the burden of proving every element of an offense, including the mental state, there’s a due process argument that evidence of intoxication that might negate that element is relevant and admissible, despite the absence of a statutory defense of voluntary intoxication. (¶27 & n.4). If that’s so, then what, if anything, should the court tell the jury about how to use that evidence?

State v. Jeffrey R. Lindahl, 2019AP997-CR, District 3, 12/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, the supreme court held that a collateral attack against a prior conviction used to enhance a penalty must be based on the denial of the right to counsel in the prior case. The court of appeals holds that “denial of the right to counsel” doesn’t include denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW.  The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1).

Outagamie County v. R.W., 2020AP1171-FT, 12/17/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Nobody testified that Rachel behaved dangerously during her extant commitment. Her doctor had no knowledge of medication non-compliance.  A social worker once saw a Haldol pill on a plate on a counter and inferred that Rachel had not taken her meds on that occasion.  The reason that doctor and social worker recommended recommitment is that several times in the past Rachel was released from commitment, stopped medication, and decompensated. To prevent that cycle, she had to be recommited. Rachel cannot change the past, so by that logic, she must be recommitted forever.

Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.

The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia.  The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.

State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.

Wisconsin is not alone. According to the ABA Journal, an Ohio Supreme Court justice has removed a trial court judge from 2 trials for allegedly failing to follow appropriate COVID precautions.

Jama I. Jama v. Jason C. Gonzalez, 2021 WI App 3; case activity (including briefs)

In Wisconsin, a person who brings a legal malpractice suit against the lawyer who represented the person in a criminal case must prove, among other things, that he or she is actually innocent of the criminal charge. Skindzelewski v. Smith, 2020 WI 57, ¶10, 392 Wis. 2d 117, 944  N.W.2d 575; Tallmadge v. Boyle, 2007 WI App 47, ¶¶15, 18, 300 Wis. 2d 510, 730 N.W.2d 173; Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, ¶¶34-49, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809. But what happens in a case of “split innocence,” when the person is guilty of some of the crimes but not others? In a case of first impression, the court of appeals holds the person need only prove his innocence of the specific criminal charges as to which he alleges the lawyer performed negligently.

State v. Thomas A. Nelson, 2021 WI App 2; 12/9/20, District 2; case activity (including briefs).

This split court of appeals opinion, which is recommended for publication, has “petition granted” written all over it.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) held that a trial court violates a defendant’s right to confrontation when it receives into evidence out-of-court statements by someone who does not testify at trial, if the statements are “testimonial” and if the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of the statement.  Yet in this case, the court of appeals holds that Nelson’s confrontation rights were not violated when the circuit court admitted a “Sexual Abuse Evaluation” requested by the police for the purpose of collecting evidence even though the author of the evaluation did not testify at trial.

Washington County v. James Michael Conigliaro, 2020AP888, District 2, 12/9/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Conigliaro appealed an order finding that he refused to submit to an evidentiary chemical test. He argued that the arresting officer, Joseph Lagash, led him to believe that he had the right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the test and/or that Lagash failed to dispel his belief that he had the right to counsel. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.