On Point

State v. Donald Simon Mullen and County of Waukesha v. Donald Simon Mullen, 2019AP1187 & 2019AP1188, 5/20/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mullen pulled his car into a bar parking lot around 1:30 a.m. and a passing officer took interest. He pulled into the lot also, and parked behind and to the left of Mullen’s parked vehicle–Mullen had exited and was standing near the closed bar’s front door. The officer pointed at Mullen an “extremely high intensity spotlight” which serves a “disabling function”–preventing the illuminated person from seeing an approaching officer–and approached him on foot, asking where he was coming from. Was Mullen seized by the time he responded in an incriminating way?

State v. Tammy Genevieve Hardenburg, 2019AP1399-CR, 5/27/20, District 1; case activity (including briefs)

At Hardenburg’s OWI trial, the court admitted three blood test reports by three different analysts, but only one of them testified. Hardenburg argued that the testifying analyst served as a conduit for the opinions by the other two in violation of the confrontation clause. She claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not (a) trying to prevent the admission of the second and third analysts’ conclusions, and (b) objecting to the first analyst’s testimony about their conclusions. The circuit court denied Hardenburg’s motion without a hearing. The court of appeals reversed:

Lawyers appointed to take State Public Defender cases are often asked to transfer their client files to successor counsel. SCOW just suspended one lawyer’s license for 5 months partly because he failed to turn over a client file, which hampered successor counsel’s representation. Read OLR v. Peter J. Kovac. This is a good reminder that our […]

State v. Adam W. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, petition for review granted 8/30/20, reversed, 2021 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)

This is a “recommended for publication”, split court of appeals opinion where the State lost in a child sexual assault case. In other words the State will surely petition for review, and SCOW will take it. Applying State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332, the majority held that the defendant’s polygraph test and the confession were two discrete events, but based on the facts of this case, the confession was involuntary. The dissent by Judge Hruz would hold the confession voluntary.

On May 22, the supreme court issued new orders addressing trial and appellate court operations as the state begins to “re-open” from the restrictions aimed to limit the spread of Covid-19.

State v. Angel Mercado, 2018AP2419-CR, petition for review of a published decision granted 5/19/20; reversed 1/20/21; case activity

Issues (from the State’s petition for review):

1.  Did the court of appeals contravene §901.03(1)(a) when it directly reviewed Mercado’s forfeited challenges to the admission of the victims’ forensic interview videos into evidence?

2.  Did the circuit court court properly admit the victims’ forensic interview videos into evidence at trial?

State v. Troy R. Lasecki, 2020 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

Wonders never cease. The State charged Lasecki with 2 counts of failure to return security deposits to tenants in violation of Wis. Admin Code. §ATCP 134.06(2) and §§100.20(2) and 100.26(3)(2013-3104). Lasecki proceeded pro se at trial, and a jury convicted  on both counts. His appeal drew amicus briefs from the Apartment Ass’n for Southeastern Wisconsin, the Univ. of Wis. Law School and from the Attorney General  about whether the statute and code criminalized the failure to return rent. Answer: “yes.” but Lasecki won anyway because the jury instructions were erroneous and the court erred in ordering restitution above the victim’s pecuniary losses.

State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-Cr, petition for review of an unpublished option granted, 5/19/20, case activity

Issues (adapted from the State’s petition for review):

1.  Under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), when a defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, he must prove that but for his lawyer’s deficient performance  he would have proceeded to trial.  More recently, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) held that a defendant can, in some circumstances, prove Strickland prejudice even without a reasonable probability of success at trial.  Given the facts of this case, did Savage prove that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea even though he couldn’t show a reasonable probability of success at trial?

2.  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 holds that a court cannot decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if a Machner hearing has not occurred. In Savage’s case, the circuit court did conduct a Machner hearing,  but the court of appeals reversed and remanded on both deficient performance and prejudice because the circuit court misapplied State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶ 5, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. Should the court of appeals have affirmed under the rule that the court of appeals may sustain a circuit court decision if there are facts in the record to support it?

Portage County v. E.R.R., 2019AP2033, 5/21/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

E.R.R.’s original commitment term expired during the pendency of his appeal, but the commitment was extended. He concedes this makes the appeal moot but argues the court should nevertheless decide his issues because they are of great public importance and likely to arise again. We’ll never know if he had a point, because the briefs are confidential and the court’s rejection of his arguments consists of a single paragraph:

State v. A.N.G., 2019AP1100, 5/21/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.N.G. and a middle-school classmate collaborated on a drawing depicting a “cartoon-style bomb,” a school, and a body on the ground. Two weeks later, a teacher caught them passing a note, which turned out to be the drawing. Naturally, the state initiated quasi-criminal proceedings alleging A.N.G. had committed disorderly conduct and made a “terrorist threat.” A.N.G. was found delinquent, but the court of appeals now reverses, saying the adjudications violate the First Amendment.