On Point

State v. A.C.M., 2018AP2423-2424, 11/12/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A.C.M.’s trial lawyer did not call her psychiatrist to testify about her mental health or her medication compliance–evidence that was important to the issue of whether she posed a safety risk to her children. The court of appeals held that even if counsel should have called the doctor, her failure to do so didn’t prejudice A.C.M.

State v. Brian L. Halverson, 2019 WI App 66; petition for review granted 3/17/20; affirmed 1/29/21; case activity (including briefs)

Until now, Wisconsin held that a person who is interviewed by law enforcement while incarcerated is per se in custody and thus must receive a Miranda warning. State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W. 2d 606 (1999). This published court of appeals’ decision holds that the SCOTUS effectively overturned Armstrong in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). Going forward, courts must determine whether an inmate is in custody by analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding his interrogation.

State v. Jeffrey L. Ionescu, 2019 WI App 68; case activity (including briefs)

A homeowner told police that he found a burglar in his car and saw him run west across his yard. About 10 minutes later, officer and a trained tracking dog headed in that direction for about 30 minutes. The officer saw footprints, and the dog detected scent, off and on along the way. Eventually they reached the yard of burglar’s mother and entered it without a warrant. She let them enter her home where they found Ionescu. Was this pursuit cold, warm or hot?

State v. Amanuel A. Ayele, 2019AP432, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ayele pleaded to a battery after an attack on his father, with whom he lived. The state had charged the crime as an incident of domestic abuse carrying a surcharge under Wis. Stat. § 973.o55 but moved, as part of the plea deal, to remove this provision. The court wouldn’t go along though, and Ayele pleaded anyway. What the court did do is waive the actual imposition of the surcharge under § 973.055(4). But the judgment of conviction still notes “Domestic Abuse Assessments” in the description of the charge, and Ayele wants the notation struck.

State v. Scott A. Walker, 2019AP1138, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury found Walker guilty of intentionally pointing a firearm at a person contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c). He claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise a defense under Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(2) and 939.49(1), which provide a privilege “to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person’s property.” The court of appeals has some doubt that Walker adequately raised this claim at the Machner hearing, ¶¶6-7, but decides it anyway on the merits, holding there was no prejudice because the facts couldn’t possibly make out the defense.

State v. Jeffrey D. Lee, 2018AP1507-CR, 11/5/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At a jury trial for child sexual assault, the circuit court admitted “other acts” evidence that Lee had similarly assaulted 5 other children. The court of appeals called the “other acts” evidence of the 3rd, 4th and 5th children “textbook hearsay,” held that the circuit court erred in admitting it, but affirmed based on the harmless error doctrine.

State v. Michael A. Nieman, 2017AP1906-CR, 11/7/29, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including State’s brief)

Nieman, pro se, appealed an order for over $13,000 in restitution entered after he pled to felony theft by false representation. The court should not have awarded any restitution, he argued. Or, if restitution was permitted, then it should be zero due a civil judgment against him arising from the same conduct.

G.K. v. S.C., 2019AP1645, 2019AP1646, & 2019AP1647, District 4, 11/7/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.C.’s parental rights to her three children were terminated due to continued denial of periods of physical placement under § 48.415(4) based on a family court order that denied her periods of physical placement. She argued the family court order could not be the basis for a TPR because it didn’t advise her of the conditions necessary for the children to be returned to her or for her to be granted placement or visitation. Maybe so, says the court of appeals, but the statute doesn’t require the family court order to do that.

State v. C.M., 2019AP1483, District 1, 11/5/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court didn’t err in entering a default judgment against C.M. in her termination of parental rights proceeding. 

Waupaca County v. J.J., 2019AP805, 10/29/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.J. challenges the termination of his parental rights, alleging trial counsel was ineffective and lack of a factual basis for his no contest plea. The court of appeals rejects both claims.