On Point

State v. K.K.E., 2019AP115-117; 9/24/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court terminated K.K.E.’s parental rights based on the best interests of her three daughters. On appeal, K.K.E. conceded that the trial court addressed the 6 “best interests of the child” factors required by §48.426(3). But she challenged the weight the trial court assigned to each factor. In affirming, the court of appeals explains how a trial court’s weighing of these factors is virtually unassailable on appeal.

In its 1973-74 term, SCOW decided a whopping 316 appeals. In the 2018-19 term it decided only 58. Of course, there was no court of appeals back in 1974. Still, what a huge change in caseload! Click on SCOWstats.com’ new stat pack for the 1973-74 term to see more dramatic differences between then and now. (Spoiler alert: 94% of opinions unanimous then. Only 49% unanimous now.)

State v. Marvin Frank Robinson, 2019AP105-106-CR; 9/24/19; District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robinson pled to misdemeanor battery with domestic abuse assessements and to knowingly violating a temporary restraining order in one case. He also pled to misdemeanor bail jumping (violation of the TRO) and other crimes in a second case.  On appeal, he challenged trial court’s application of the domestic abuse modifier and its imposition of the domestic abuse surcharge, but the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Troy K. Kettlewell, 2018AP926, 9/18/2019, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is a very fact-intensive OWI case and the court is to be commended for really critically examining what all these facts add up to: not much. As in, not much reason to think Kettlewell was in any danger, so no good reason to go into his house without a warrant.

State v. James Edward Olson, 2018AP1987, 9/17/18, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Olson says that the DOC extended his probation by six months without notice to him, and he shouldn’t have to pay the fees associated with those six months. The court of appeals has two problems with this claim: the record contains an order for the extension, apparently signed by him, and his probation ended in 1997.

State v. Tyler J. Yost, 2018AP2251-CR, 9/18/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Loose lips sink ships. They can also land you in jail for another year. That’s what happened to Yost when he and other inmates started bad mouthing their probation agent while chilling in the common area of the Waukesha County Jail. Yost allegedly called his agent a “bitch” and said that when he got out he was going to “crimp her brake lines,” and he didn’t care if her kids or family were in the car. 

State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)

Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers.  The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution  and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period  on Count 2 would be revoked.

State v. Taurus Donnell Renfro, 2019AP193, 9/17/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Renfro was a passenger in a car stopped by the police. He was riding from his old residence to his parents’ house–he was moving in with them. When asked, he told the officers that he was carrying a gun in his pocket, and that he didn’t have a concealed-carry permit. A jury convicted him of violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23.

Walker v. Pollard, 18C0147, Eastern District of Wisconsin, 9/4/19

Montgomery Walker is a pro se habeas petitioner who alleges that his postconviction/appellate counsel should have raised a claim of juror bias. In an order granting Walker an evidentiary hearing, the U.S. District Court holds that our supreme court was wrong, in State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146, to say an appellate lawyer can’t be ineffective for failing to raise a claim unless that claim is “clearly stronger” that claims the lawyer did raise. The decision explains that SCOW misread Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), as imposing such a rule.

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?