On Point

State v. Johnalee A. Kawalec, 2017AP798, 7/24/19, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

We’ve questioned the blanket claim that a lawyer can’t be ineffective for failing to argue an unsettled proposition of law. Here we have the sort of case for which the general rule makes some sense. Kawalec was charged with theft by a bailee under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). She was the holder of a joint bank account with the alleged victim; the victim had given her a power of attorney but the relationship fell apart and she was accused of having used some of the funds for her own benefit, rather than abiding by the prohibition on self-dealing inherent in the POA.

City of Milwaukee v. David B. Munzinger, 2018AP2186, 7/23/2019, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Munzinger fought his OWI citation in the municipal court and lost; he filed an appeal to the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14. To do this, his counsel filed a form  in the circuit court captioned “Notice of Appeal” (probably this one, provided by the municipal court). He also emailed the city attorney alerting him to the appeal and apparently spoke to him about it. But, his email didn’t include a copy of the “Notice of Appeal” form. The city moved to dismiss and the circuit court granted the motion.

SCOW watchers may be interested in SCOWstats’ 3 new posts on the 2018-2019 term.  The justices issued fewer fractured opinions, fewer separate opinions, and shorter opinions. With all of these efficiencies you might guess that they decided more cases. But the number of decisions actually dropped this term. Also, the data reveals the impact of Justice Abrahamson’s reduced participation in the cases SCOW did take. With her departure on July 31st, that is likely to continue.

State v. Craig L. Miller, 2018AP2161-CR, 7/18/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Miller pled guilty to disorderly conduct as a domestic abuse incident and as a repeater. He appealed arguing that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because of his schizophrenia diagnosis and the medication he was taking. The court of appeals ruled against him due to a lack of evidence.

State v. Denise R. Campbell, 2018AP1190, 7/16/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is a state’s appeal of the suppression of evidence derived from the stopping of Denise Campbell’s vehicle. The arresting deputy testified to various unusual driving behaviors and, in the court of appeals’ view, the trial court credited that testimony but misapplied the law to the facts. The court of appeals accordingly reverses the grant of suppression.

Walworth County DHS v. S.S.K., 2019AP782, 7/17/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

During the grounds phase of the Walworth County’s TPR case against S.S.K., she “admitted” the ground of continuing CHIPS; she didn’t plead “no contest.”  This distinction proved decisive to the court of appeals’ decision to affirm the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, A.S.L. 

State v. Kevin B. Hutchins, 2018AP1144-CR, 7/16/2019, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hutchins had a jury trial for the alleged sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery of the mother of his children. The judge permitted her to testify, over objection, that he had hit her on other, earlier occasions–the proffered purpose of this testimony being to show why she didn’t immediately go to the police after this incident (and thus, apparently, to defend the credibility of her story). The court of appeals affirms.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, petition for review granted 7/10/19; case activity

Issue: 

A doctor opined that David (a pseudonym) is unable to care for himself, and therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), because he lost employment and relies on the assistance of the government and his family for income and housing. As a matter of law, did the circuit err by concluding that the county, under these circumstances, met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that David is dangerous?

Today Mad in America, a nonprofit that publishes a webzine on science, psychiatry and social justice ran a long article on the dark side of “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” or, as we think of it in Wisconsin, “outpatient recommitments.” Turns out they have a very dark side. Chapter 51 practitioners may find the many studies and surveys linked to in this article helpful in preparing their clients cases.

United States v. Davis, USSC No. 18-431, June 24, 2019, affirming and vacating in part, United states v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

No surprise here.  Section 18 U.S.C. §924(c) makes it a crime to use a firearm during a crime of violence and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) defined a crime of violence as an offense that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force would be used in committing it. SCOTUS declared similar language unconstitutionally vague in  Sessions v. Dimaya, and it followed suit here.