On Point

Waukesha County v. M.D.S., Jr., 2024AP1315, District II, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects “Smith’s” challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this chapter 51 case, concluding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standard and the county met its burden to show that Smith was dangerous under sub. 2.b.

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, 11/6/24, District II (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case confirming the changes wrought to other acts case law as a result of the codification of the greater latitude rule, COA reverses the circuit court’s order excluding evidence of a prior sexual assault

State v. Carter Nelson, 2024AP617-CR, 11/6/24, District II (one judge decision; not eligible for publication); case activity

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order granting Carter Nelson’s motion to suppress cocaine seized from his vehicle without a warrant and without probable cause.  The Court held that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in a standard inventory search when Nelson’s vehicle was towed.

State v. Michael Joseph Gasper, 2023AP2319, 10/30/24, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court held that an officer’s warrantless inspection of a cyber tip digital video file provided to the officer and identified as child pornography by a private internet service provider constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The COA concludes that Gasper did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video, which he uploaded to Snapchat in violation of the terms of service and reverses.

The Seventh Circuit has been quiet as of late; accordingly, we tried to consolidate the recap for our readers here:

State v. M.M.K., 2024AP591-CR, 2024AP592-CR, 2024AP593-CR, 2024AP594-CR, 10/31/24, District IV(1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case which continues a new trend in appeals of involuntary medication appeals, COA holds that while the circuit court correctly found M.M.K. incompetent, it failed to correctly apply Sell in ordering involuntary medication.

State v. T.H.-M., 2024AP1271-1273, District I, 10/29/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In another dense and fact-specific opinion, COA holds that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the parent was unfit and rejects T.H.-M.’s argument that the circuit court improperly weighed the evidence at disposition.

Waukesha County Dept. of Health & Human Services v. M.M.M., 2024AP1622, 10/30/24, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a straightforward case addressing sufficiency of the evidence, the COA affirmed the circuit court’s order to terminate M.M.M’s (referred to as Mary) parental rights.  The Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding grounds to terminate her parental rights, and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it determined terminating Mary’s parental rights to her son (referred to as Neal) was in his best interest.

State v. K.R.C., 2023AP2102, 10/30/24, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a “close” suppression appeal, COA confronts a fact pattern arising from the intersection between policing and school discipline, finds that a reasonable 12-year old would have felt free to walk away from interviews with law enforcement and school authorities on school grounds, and finds the repeated injection of inadmissible evidence at the court trial harmless.

State v. Kayden Young, 2021AP1596-CR, 10/29/24, District III (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case recommended for publication, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order dismissing the charge against Kayden Young for failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirements.  Where the circuit court did not require Young to register as a sex offender when it placed him on probation, but required registration when it sentenced him after revocation of probation, “that latter order controls the defendant’s requirement to comply with sex offender registration.”  (¶ 22).