On Point

County of Milwaukee v. Ross J. Romenesko, 2017AP1042-1044, 6/19/18, District 1, (1-judge appeal, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Romenesko prevailed below–the circuit court (1) suppressed a revised report relating to his blood sample, (2)  precluded but one of its experts from testifying, and eventually (3) dismissed the the OWI 1st offense and operating with a PAC 1st offense charges against him as a sanction against the County. The court of appeals affirmed the suppression decision but reversed the other 2 decisions.

State v. Theoris Raphel Stewart, 2018 WI App 41; case activity (including briefs)

Facing sentencing for failure to pay child support, Stewart forged some documents to support his argument for probation rather than a prison sentence. For his trouble he was charged with and convicted of identity theft under § 943.203(2). The court of appeals rejects his argument that his use of the forged documents did not violate that statute. 

State v. Laron Henry, 2017AP939-CR & 2017AP940-CR, District 1, 6/19/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Henry sought to withdraw his guilty pleas to three crimes. He claimed that with respect to one of the crimes, he didn’t “ratify” his guilty plea, he didn’t understand one of the elements of the crime, and there wasn’t a factual basis for the plea to the crime. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

Tyson Timbs v. Indiana, USSC 17-1091, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Does the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), apply where a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver?

Congratulations to ASPD Lee Todd and Prof. Stuart Banner of the UCLA School of Law Supreme Court Clinic. They collaborated on a petition for writ of certiorari in Bartelt v. Wisconsin, and SCOTUSblog has named it “Petition of the Day.” The question presented is: Whether a non-custodial interrogation at a police station becomes custodial once the […]

State v. Anthony R. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 6/15/18, affirming a split, unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP1799-Cr, case activity (including briefs)

This split decision clarifies important aspects of ineffective assistance of counsel law, sentencing law, and appellate procedure. In addition, Justice Abrahamson’s dissent includes a word of caution for lawyers representing clients who have experienced brain trauma that may affect their mental capacity.

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 6/11/18; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted of first-offense OWI causing injury, but that conviction was expunged. So, when he picked up another OWI, was it a first or a second?

State v. Scott H. Wenger, 2017AP2305, 6/14/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wenger got arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting at Art in the Park in Stevens point. The circuit court dismissed the DC but found him guilty, after a bench trial, of resisting. He claims insufficient evidence as to all three elements of resisting an officer:

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2018 WI 67, 6/15/18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

For years the DNA surcharge statute said that a court “shall” impose a surcharge on certain felony sex offenses and “may” impose a surcharge on any other felony offense. See § 973.046 (1g) and (1r) (2011-12). That changed in 2013 Wis. Act 20, §§ 2353 and 2354, which amended the statute to say a court “shall” impose a surcharge for all criminal convictions, including misdemeanors, committed on or after January 1, 2014. A unanimous supreme court holds that in making this change the legislature intended to eliminate a circuit court’s discretion to waive the surcharge by requiring the surcharge to be imposed in every case.