On Point

There seems to be a debate over this issue. If you practice juvenile law, you might was to weigh in here at the Cyntonia Brown and the “51 to life” project. Attorney Robert Donohoo already has.

State v. Anton R. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, 1/25/28, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

On Point has posted extensively about this case here regarding the court of appeals’ two opinions and here regarding Dorsey’s petition for review. This post focuses on the bottom line for trial lawyers because the majority opinion cements a change in Wisconsin law. Under common law, the “greater latitude rule” allows for the more liberal admission of “other acts” evidence in cases of sexual abuse particularly those involving children. Opinion ¶32. In 2013, the legislature amended §904.04(2)(b)1, and according to the majority, thereby extended this rule to a range of cases beyond child sexual abuse, including domestic abuse.  Specifically :

State v. Daniel E. Olsen, 2017AP918-CR, District 4, 1/25/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

At the request of DOC, the circuit court extended Olsen’s probation by one year and increased his monthly restitution payment. His challenges to the court’s orders fail. 

Judge Lynn Adelman, Eastern District of Wisconsin,  wrote an article by that name.  SSRN recently posted it online. An excerpt from the abstract is pasted in below. Don’t hold back. The article is short, and you won’t regret reading the whole thing . . . unless perhaps you’re Newt Gingrich, Bill Clinton, or a state appellate judge. 🙂

Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.

Milwaukee County v. Nicholas O. Moran, 2017AP1047 & 2017AP1048, District 1, 1/23/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion to believe Moran was operating while intoxicated, so police were justified in continuing to detain Moran to conduct field sobriety tests.

State v. M.D.W., 2017AP1945 & 1946, 1/23/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.D.W. appeals only the disposition in the TPR of her two children. She argues that the court erred in its consideration of the statutory factors. The court of appeals disagrees.

District of Columbia v. Wesby, USSC No. 15-1485, 2017 WL 491521 (January 22, 2018), reversing Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The probable-cause determination in this case is quite fact-specific, and the qualified immunity issue is of little interest to criminal practitioners. Perhaps more interesting is Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, which signals she is open to reconsidering whether the existence of probable cause necessarily validates an arrest.

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds that a defendant may not seek expunction after sentence is imposed because the language of § 973.015 and State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, require the decision regarding expunction to be made at the sentencing hearing.

And a popular algorithm is no better at predicting crime than random people. Details here and here.