On Point

OLR v. Michael D. Petersen, 2016AP563-D, 12/15/17 (case activity )

I am a crook. I am a cheat. I am a thief. I am a liar. I was convicted of a crime on November 9th, 2015. My conviction resulted from my intentional choice to sell my own clients down the river and then trying to cover it up. You may not hire me or have me legally represent you in any fashion until you read the Criminal Complaint and Judgment of Conviction in my Outagamie County Wisconsin Case No. 15CM878. This disclosure is required as one of the conditions of my probation. Op. ¶34

Do we have your attention?

State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2016AP1409-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 12/13/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point):

1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions for self defense and accident on the lesser included charge of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?

2. Alternatively, is a new trial in the interest of justice warranted because the erroneous jury instructions on self defense and accident prevented the real controversy from being tried?

3. Did the erroneous instructions on self defense and accident violate due process by relieving the state of the burden to prove every element of the offense?

4. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?

Hughes v. United States, USSC No. 17-155, certiorari granted 12/8/12

Questions presented:

1. Whether this Court’s decision in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), means that the concurring opinion in a 4-1-4 decision represents the holding of the Court where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other.

2.Whether, under Marks, the lower courts are bound by the four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), or, instead, by Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices disagreed.

3. Whether, as the four-Justice plurality in Freeman concluded, a defendant who enters into a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range.

State v. Antonio Johnson, 2018 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

Under § 973.155(1)(a) a convicted offender is entitled to credit for “all days spent in custody” in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed. So what’s a “day” for credit purposes? Any part of a calendar day, as Johnson claims? Or a continuous twenty-four-hour period, as the state asserts? Based on supreme court cases dealing with credit, the court of appeals agrees with Johnson that it is any part of a calendar day.

State v. Bobby Lopez, 2017AP923-CR, District 2, 2/13/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In order to be “within” the 10-year period under § 346.65(2)(am)2., the subsequent offense must occur before the tenth anniversary of the prior offense. Thus, Lopez’s July 9, 2016, OWI offense is not “within [the] 10-year period” that began on July 9, 2006, the date of his prior offense, and he can’t be charged with second-offense OWI.

State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2017AP208-CR, District 2, certification filed 12/13/17, certification granted 3/14/18, affirmed, 2018 WI 106; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification):

If a search warrant issued under WIS. STAT. § 968.12 for the placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle is not executed within five days after the date of issuance per WIS. STAT. § 968.15(1) is the warrant void under § 968.15(2), even if the search was otherwise reasonably conducted?

Dassey v. Dittman, 2017 WL 6154050, (7th Cir. 12/8/17)

This is the decision Making a Murderer watchers have been waiting for. Critics and ivory tower dwellers will celebrate the result (a 4-3 win for the prosecution) but also the concise, dispassionate exposition of the law on involuntary confessions and its application to a hypothetical Brendan Dassey–someone mature, intelligent, unsusceptible to manipulation or coercion by “interviewers.” Documentary fans and lawyers having real world experience representing clients with diminished mental capacity will prefer Chief Judge Diane Wood’s biting dissent. She nails the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and applies the law to the human Dassey–a 16-year old with an IQ in the low 80s.

State v. Travis J. Rose, 2018 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)

A police officer investigating reports of Rose’s erratic driving concluded Rose was not intoxicated by alcohol, but continued to detain him and, after securing consent, searched Rose’s car, where he found narcotics. The court of appeals holds the officer’s continued detention of Rose, and thus the consent to search the car, were lawful because the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation.

State v. S.N.N., 2016AP2102 & 2016AP2103, District 1, 12/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.N.N. admitted the continuing CHIPS ground that was alleged in the TPR petition regarding her two children. The court of appeals rejects her claim that her admission was not knowing and voluntary.

State v. Bradley E. Ammann, 2017AP866-CR, 12/7/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A state trooper stopped Ammann for speeding as he and his wife were driving home from a wedding reception. The trooper asked Amman to exit the car and then smelled intoxicants on him. This led to field sobriety tests and then a preliminary breath test showing that Ammann had an .068 alcohol concentration. He almost escaped with a mere citation for speeding except the trooper had to go and check his driving record.