On Point

J.N.W. v. J.R.P., 2017AP1390, 9/20/17, District 2 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Robert, the father of Jessica, appeals the termination of is parental rights. Specifically, he argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether he failed to communicate with her for more than six months, and even if he did, whether he had good cause for his failure.

State v. Guy S. Hillary, 2017 WI App 67; case activity (including briefs)

In this case, a deputy applied for a warrant, saying he had

received anonymous information on June 13, 2014 that a subject went to Guy S Hillary’s residence to fix a vehicle and Hillary proceeded to show the complainant a very large marijuana grow in a garage on Hillary’s property. Complainant stated that there are several grow rooms within the garage containing several large marijuana plants. Complainant stated that Hillary was bragging about how much money he makes selling marijuana.

Both parties agree that this did not establish probable cause–their dispute is about whether other information in the affidavit was lawfully obtained and, if not, whether it had to be excised. The court of appeals, however, rejects the state’s concession and declares this tip good enough.

State v. Kory v. Ambroziak, 2017AP22-CR, 9/19/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ambroziak argued that he was incorrectly sentenced for a 2nd-offense OWI because the State had failed to prove the existence of a prior OWI-related offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But the court of appeals held that the State carried its burden. Thus, the circuit court correctly sentenced Ambroziak with second-offense OWI penalties.

In case you missed it, the New York Times ran an interview with him last week. And now the ABA Journal has this story: “Posner says most judges regard pro se litigants as ‘kind of trash not worth the time.’” Both mention his forthcoming book on the topic. He predicts that it will make his […]

State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.

State v. David McAlister, Sr., 2014AP2561, petition granted 9/11/17; affirmed 4/18/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (copied from petition for review)

1. The central issue at trial was whether McAlister participated in the charged robberies. The state’s evidence on that point consisted entirely of the allegations of two confessed participants seeking to mitigate the consequences of their own misconduct. The jury knew that the state’s witnesses had a motive to falsely accuse McAlister but those witnesses denied under oath having done so. Under these circumstances, is newly discovered evidence from three separate witnesses swearing that the state’s witnesses admitted prior to trial that they intended to falsely accuse McAlister “cumulative” and “merely tend to impeach the credibility of witnesses” such that it could not support a newly discovered evidence claim?

2. Whether the allegations of McAlister’s §974.06 motion were sufficient to require a new trial and therefore an evidentiary hearing on his claim.

State v. Andre L. Scott, 2016AP2017-CR, bypass granted 9/12/17, case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether, despite State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), a circuit court may use §971.14(4)(b) to require a nondangerous defendant to be treated to competency against his will, and if so, whether §971.14(4)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not comport with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2. Whether an order requiring an inmate to be involuntarily treated to competency is a nonfinal order that should be challenged by a Wis. Stat. §809.50 petition for interlocutory appeal or a final order of a special proceeding that is appealable as a matter of right via Wis. Stat. §808.03(1).

3. Whether the court of appeals exercises its discretion erroneously when it denies a motion for relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR, certification granted 9/12/17; case activity (including briefs). This is the second certification of this case; here’s the first.

Issue

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNA surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

Waukesha County DHHS v. T.C.S., 2016AP1000 & 1001, 9/13/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a case type we rarely come across–an appeal of a guardianship arising out of a CHIPS case. (See generally Wis. Stat. § 48.977.) The circuit court awarded custody of the child at issue to his paternal grandparents; this is the mother’s appeal.

Review of a summary order of the court of appeals; affirmed 5/4/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review):

Anthony Jones was committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 after a trial at which the state presented expert testimony relying in part on two actuarial instruments: the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR. Mr. Jones had moved pretrial to exclude these instruments as unreliable under Wisconsin’s new Daubert standard, because they are decades old and were constructed using questionable means. The circuit court permitted their introduction on the ground that they are still in use and that the state’s expert had testified that they are reliable. Did the court adequately scrutinize the instruments for reliability, as is its responsibility under Daubert?