On Point

State v. James D. Carter, 2016AP1054-CR, District 1, 7/5/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Carter was charged in a 20-count information with various crimes, most of them involving theft and forgery arising out of a scam Carter perpetrated against multiple victims using the same basic modus operandi in October and November. But he was also charged with a burglary in June, which wasn’t part of the scam and looked nothing like the acts committed during the scam. (Pages 3-5). [NB: We’re citing to pages rather than paragraphs because on pages 6-7 and 12-15 the paragraph numbering is messed up.] The court of appeals rejects his argument that the burglary charge was improperly joined to the other charges.

State v. S.D., 2016AP1701-1702, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR appeal raises a number of interesting issues ranging from a Daubert challenge to the State’s psychologist and “parenting capacity assessment” to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise an “unconstitutional as applied” challenge to the standard jury instruction on “failure to assume parental responsibility.”

State v. M.G., 2016AP1197, District 1, 7/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.G. moved to withdraw his no contest plea to the petition to terminate his parental rights based on CHIPS grounds. He alleged the plea colloquy was deficient regarding his waiver of the right to trial because his lawyer and the judge referred to his having a “second” trial regarding disposition, and that he was confused by these statements. (¶15). The court of appeals finds no deficiency in the plea colloquy and therefore no basis for plea withdrawal.

Not to beat a dead horse, but Professor Eve Brensike Primus of the University of Michigan Law School has just written a report called Defense Counsel and Public Defense. The abstract starts like this: Public defense delivery systems nationwide are grossly inadequate. Public defenders are forced to handle caseloads that no one could effectively manage. […]

Honorable William Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2017 WI 67, 6/27/2017, affirming circuit court on bypass; case activity (including briefs)

The legislature created the Crime Victims Rights Board and tasked it with, among other things, issuing “private and public reprimands of public officials” who violate victims’ rights as defined by our state Constitution and statutes. Wis. Stat. 950.09(2)(a). The supreme court now declares this mission contrary to the state Constitution when those “public officials” are judges. 

State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 6/29/17, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014AP1623-CR; case activity (including briefs)

Forget the old saws that “appellate courts decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds,” “appellate courts should not reach constitutional issues when another issue is dispositive,” and “the supreme court should not decide issues forfeited in the court of appeals.” They don’t constrain SCOW here. Indeed, the majority opinion rushes past the plain language of §971.12(3) in order to decide a major Confrontation Clause issue and to reverse a big defense win in the court of appeals.

State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, petition for review granted 12/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 73; case activity (including briefs)

We all know that an appellate court determines the accuracy of a trial court’s jury instructions by reviewing them as a whole, not in isolation. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 637-638, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).  But surely this doesn’t mean that a “whole” that includes incomplete, inaccurate instructions for some charges is fine so long as it includes the correct instructions for other charges. Surely we don’t expect 12 people unfamiliar with the complex law of “self defense” and “accident” to determine which versions of these instructions are correct and whether the same version applies to three distinct charges. This split opinion says “sure we do.” Judge Reilly objects to the majority’s “as long as the correct words are in there somewhere” approach to instructing a jury. Hopefully, SCOW will too.

State v. Nathan J. Paape, 2015AP2462-CR, District 2, 6/28/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paape and a co-defendant, Antonio Barbeau, were convicted as adults for a first degree intentional homicide they committed when they were 13 years old. Both received the mandatory life sentence and both were granted eligibility under § 973.014(1g)(a)2. to petition for release to extended supervision under § 302.114(5), Paape after 30 years, Barbeau after about 35 years. Both argued their sentences were invalid under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The court of appeals rejected Barbeau’s arguments last year, State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, and it now rejects Paape’s arguments.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.