On Point

State v. Judith Ann Detert-Moriarty, 2017 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

The Wisconsin Equal Access to Justice Act, § 814.245, doesn’t apply to a person who prevailed in a forfeiture action brought in the name of the State of Wisconsin because the clear statutory language covers only actions brought by “a state agency.”

Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.

State ex rel. Vincent Martinez v. Brian Hayes, 2014AP2095, District 2, 12/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Martinez claimed the lawyer who represented him at his ES revocation hearing should have objected to certain hearsay evidence and to the ALJ’s failure to find good cause for the lack of appearance of certain witnesses. The court of appeals rejects the claim because even if counsel was deficient, Martinez wasn’t prejudiced.

Review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (from the petition):

I. Whether the circuit court properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s warrantless blood test because he was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the test when he was read the informing the accused form which incorrectly told him that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused chemical testing, when he was actually only facing a possible arrest?

II. Whether the circuit court below properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s blood test where Mr. Blackman was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the blood test, under the totality of the circumstances, when he acquiesced to the unlawful assertion by the officer that they take blood samples in cases like his—in addition to being told that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused?

III. Whether section 343.305(3)(ar)2 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it coerces consent to otherwise unconstitutional searches without due process of law?

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (composed by On Point):

1.  Whether a driver, who is a non-native speaker of English, consents to a blood draw where, in response to the officer’s question “will you consent” gives an unintelligible answer, then clearly asks “what kind of test?” and “don’t you need a warrant?” and where the driver does not otherwise “resist” or “fight” the blood draw?

2.  Whether a driver’s acquiescence to a blood draw is voluntary when it occurs after he asks the officer “don’t you need a warrant?” and the officer shakes his head “no.”

State v. Rachel M. Helmbrecht, 2017 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)

A circuit court’s decision on whether to order expungement under § 973.015 involves the exercise of discretion, and therefore the general rules governing the proper exercise of discretion apply to the expungement decision.

State v. Marie A. Martin, 2016AP913-CR, District 1, 12/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer’s contact with the driver of a car idling in a parking lot at 2:00 a.m. was lawful because the objective facts justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Gregory J. McMillan, 2016AP127-CR, 12/16/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

12:30 a.m., Saturday, Dodge Charger, driving away from tavern-rich area of McFarland. No bad driving, but a “relatively sudden” right turn with a squad two car lengths behind. The turn is onto a dead-end street with only “large industrial-type buildings.” Officer drives around a back way and sees McMillan standing at the back of his car talking on his phone. From where he’s standing, McMillan could have snuck into the shadows had he seen the squad following him, instead of coming around a back way. Officer stops McMillan. Reasonable suspicion?

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, 12/15/2016, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 15 ; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant pleading to a sexual assault involving sexual contact (as opposed to sexual intercourse) is required to understand the meaning of “sexual contact.” If he or she does not, he or she is entitled to plea withdrawal. State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 N.W.2d 18. Here, the court of appeals holds that a defendant pleading to child enticement with a purpose to engage in a sexual assault by “sexual contact” need not understand the meaning of this phrase.

Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, cert. granted 12/14/16

Question presented (based on the cert. petition):

To establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant who has pleaded guilty based on deficient advice from his attorney must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Under this standard, is it always irrational for a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended family and business ties to the United States to reject a plea offer despite strong evidence of guilt because the plea would result in mandatory deportation or permanent exclusion?