On Point

State v. Timothy A. Giese, 2015AP1838-CR, District 3, 9/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court’s recent decision in City of Eau Claire v. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, disposes of Giese’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over a mistakenly charged second-offense OWI.

State v. Gary Abdullah Salaam, 2014AP2666-CR & 2667-CR, 9/13/2016, District 1 (Not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Salaam raises four claims challenging his convictions, at jury trial, of recklessly endangering safety, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of witness intimidation. The court affirms as to the first two counts but finds insufficient evidence as to the witness intimidation charges.

State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, petition for review granted 1/18/2017, reversed, 2017 WI 104; case activity (including briefs)

This decision is important to anyone who litigates claims for plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2) because it helps clarify the law in two ways. First, it provides two examples of a circuit court’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c)’s requirement that the defendant be warned about the immigration consequences of a plea. Second, it explains what a defendant must allege to make a sufficient showing that his or her plea is likely to result in deportation.

State v. Armin G. Wand, III, 2015AP1366-CR, 9/8/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armin Wand and his brother Jeremy were convicted of crimes relating to a fire at Wand’s residence that killed his three sons, seriously injured his wife and caused the death of the fetus she was carrying. Before he pled, Wand moved to suppress statements he made to officers on two consecutive days; the court suppressed the first day’s as involuntary but admitted the second day’s. He appeals on various grounds connected to the admission of those later statements.

State v. Kerry A. Siekierzynski, 2015AP2350-CR, District 3, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Siekierzynski’s acts during an angry, emotional confrontation with his ex-wife over child visitation were enough to support the guilty verdict for disorderly conduct.

State v. Mary G. Zinda, 2016AP455-CR, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Two police officers approached Zinda as she got out of her car on her own driveway, but this did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And even if it was a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Zinda was operating while intoxicated.

State v. John J. Valenti, 2016AP662, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After stopping and ticketing Valenti for speeding, a state trooper continued to detain him to investigate whether he was operating while intoxicated. The court of appeals rejects Valenti’s claim that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts justifying expanding the investigatory purpose of the stop because the only fact on which the trooper acted was a general odor of intoxicants, which could have emanated from the passenger. (¶¶2-4, 6, 9).

The Marhsall Project is running a multi-part series on the public defense crisis in the United States with special emphasis on Louisiana. It promises to report on some “unorthodox forms of representation” that “have now become unexceptional for poor people accused of crimes.”  Click here to read the first story in this series.

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently answered that question “no.” State v. Hand, 2016 Ohio 5504, 2016 WL 4486068, 8/25/16. Hand rejects the majority position on this question, and instead adopts the position of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001), holding that the lack of a jury trial in juvenile proceedings under Ohio law means a juvenile adjudication isn’t a “prior conviction” that, under Appendi v.  New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), can be used to enhance a sentence without having the jury determine the existence of the prior conviction.

Francisco Carrion v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3241, 2016 WL 4537374, 8/31/16

Carrion’s habeas petition made the novel claim that his confession was involuntary because of the fact it was translated by the investigating detective. You won’t be surprised to learn that the federal courts rejected his claim.