On Point

County of Milwaukee v. Alpesh Shah, 2015AP1581, District 1, 8/16/16 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Shaw was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance in his blood pre-McNeely. He challenged the warrantless draw of his blood because there were no exigent circumstances–THC doesn’t dissipate like alcohol, and the deputy had plenty of time to get a warrant. Moreover, the State did not charge him with operating while under the influence, so dissipation wasn’t even relevant. The State only need to show that THC was present in his blood, not that a particular amount of THC was in his blood.

State v. Mychael R. Hatcher, 2015AP297-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hatcher was convicted of sexually assaulting an intoxicated person, obstructing an officer, and bail-jumping. This 38-page court of appeals decision rejects claims that the trial court erred in refusing to accept Hatcher’s guilty plea, admitting expert testimony during the State’s rebuttal, admitting evidence of the victim’s flirting, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for suppression and for introducing into evidence a report showing the victim’s BAC.

State v. Patrick P. Haynes, 2015AP2176-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion by exceeding the OWI guidelines when sentencing Haynes for OWI 3rd after his probation for the offense was revoked.

Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16

The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.

Steven D. Lisle, Jr., v. Guy Pierce, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3047, 2016 WL 4245489, 8/11/16

Lisle sought federal habeas relief from his murder and aggravated battery convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of a hearsay statement identifying him as the man who shot two people, one fatally. But the state courts reasonably applied clearly established federal law on the question, so his quest for relief is denied.

Kenneth Morris v. Bryan Bartow, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3482, 2016 WL 4207960, 8/10/16

Morris claims his guilty plea to first degree reckless homicide was involuntary, and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of involuntariness in his no-merit appeal. The Seventh Circuit rejects his claims.

Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittmann, U.S. District Court (E.D. Wis.) No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, 8/12/16

Brendan Dassey was charged with homicide and sexual assault after confessing to being involved in the murder of Teresa Halbach along with his uncle, Steven Avery. He challenged his confession, arguing it was involuntary, but the trial court and court of appeals disagreed. In a lengthy, fact-intensive decision, a federal magistrate holds that the state courts’ conclusions involve both an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

State v. Terry C. Craig, Jr., 2016AP177-CR, District 4, 8/11/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Craig struck and shattered the left tail light on an old car but he did not put a baseball-sized hole or a 2 inch crack on the left of it. That was preexisting damage. The circuit court ordered him to pay restitution for it any way, and the court of appeals affirmed.

In May, On Point reported on U.S. v. Randy Johnson, a split decision by the 7th Circuit in which the dissent accused the majority of authorizing Milwaukee police to seize someone for “parking while black.” See our post here. Guess what? The 7th Circuit just granted rehearing en banc, so stay tuned for further developments this case.

So held the 10th Circuit in U.S. v. Ackerman last week.  The case “considers how the Fourth Amendment applies to a child pornography detection system set up by Internet service providers and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).” In a post “for serious 4th Amendment nerds” Orin Kerr pokes holes in the court’s analysis and discusses the deepening circuit split over this issue.