On Point

State v. Jesus C. Gonzalez, 2015AP784-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gonzalez raises two challenges to his conviction, at jury trial, of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment. The court of appeals finds any error harmless.

State v. Beverly Reshall Holt, 2013AP2738-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court did not err in admitting the audiovisual recording of the forensic interview of Caleb, one of the child victims, at Holt’s trial for child sexual assault.

City of Rhinelander v. Thomas V. Wakely, 2015Ap302, 3/8/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

While the accident reporting requirement under § 346.70(1) requires that property damage reach a certain minimum “apparent [monetary] extent” before the accident is reportable, it does not require a minimum monetary extent for personal injuries before the accident is reportable.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

Does the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

Does the Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause prohibit a circuit court from relying on hearsay evidence in deciding a suppression motion?

Michael Wearry v. Burl Cain, USSC No. 14-10008, 2016 WL 854158 (per curiam) (March 7, 2016); reversing the 21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, No. 01-FELN-015992, Div. A, application for writ denied, 161 So.3d 620 (La. 2015); Scotusblog page

The state violated Wearry’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence that would have affected the credibility of witnesses implicating Wearry in a capital murder. Wearry is therefore entitled to a new trial.

The latest edition of SCOWstats crunches the numbers on both petitions for review and merits decisions in criminal cases during the pre-Butler years, the Butler years, and recent years.  The odds of getting a petition for review granted hasn’t change much over time. The State wins about 60% of its petitions and defendants win about […]

David Conrad v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3216, 3/4/16

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), held that the ex post facto clause prohibits a sentencing court from using a Sentencing Guideline in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guideline in effect at the time of the offense if the new version of the Guideline provides a higher applicable sentencing range than the old version. The Seventh Circuit holds Peugh shouldn’t be applied retroactively to allow resentencing in a case that was final before Peugh was decided.

State v. John D. Arthur Griffin, 2015AP1271-CR, 3/3/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals finds that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car Griffin was driving and, even though that suspicion dissipated during the encounter, that the continued detention of Griffin was reasonable.

Lockhart v. United States, USSC No. 14-8358, 2016 WL 782862  (March 1, 2016); affirming United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography must be given a prison term of at least ten years if the defendant “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Federal courts had disagreed about whether a conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” had to “involv[e] a minor or ward,” or whether the “minor or ward” language applied only to convictions for “abusive sexual conduct.” The Supreme Court holds, 6 to 2, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.”