On Point

State v. B.A.H., 2015AP1256-FT, District 4, 10/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

While restitution is a possible disposition in a proceeding involving a juvenile in need of protection or services (JIPS), it can only be ordered when there has been a finding a finding the juvenile committed a delinquent act. Because there was no such finding in the JIPS case involving B.A.H., the juvenile court had no authority to order restitution.

Sauk County DHS v. A.C., 2015AP898 & 2015AP899, District 4, 10/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.C.’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to take steps to exclude evidence about the termination of A.C.’s rights to a child in a prior case and about her parenting conduct toward that child and another child.

State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 15; case activity (including briefs)

Addressing a question left open by State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, the court of appeals holds that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect.

State v. Courtney E. Sobonya, 2015 WI App 86; case activity (including briefs)

Sobonya launched a creative challenge to the denial of her §973.015 request for expungement.  The court had held that while she would benefit from expungement, society would be harmed by the reduced deterrent effect of her sentence.  So Sobonya moved for sentence modification based on an expert report showing that the public safety is best served by removing the barriers that convicted offenders face when trying to reintegrate into society.

X.J. v. G.G., 2015AP1549, District 3, 10/21/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 48.42(1), an adoptive parent may join the biological parent in a petition to terminate the parental rights of the other biological parent, and because joining the petition makes the adoptive parent a party, the adoptive parent is not subject to sequestration as a witness.

Speaking of Padilla (see below), yesterday the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held in Dimaya v. Lynch that “the definition of a ‘crime of violence’ – one of over thirty categories of convictions that constitute an ‘aggravated felony’ under federal immigration law – is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.” Click here to see the ImmigrationProf Blog post about the […]

This just in: “The Pressure Is On–Criminal Defense Counsel Strategies after Padilla v. Kentucky,” by Bill Ong Hing at the University of San Francisco Law School. When representing an immigrant defendant, trial counsel’s duties are now much more demanding than they were before Padilla. What qualifies as “competent” counsel in these circumstances? Click here for […]

If you are working on a COMPAS issue, you may be interested in a new research paper, “Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing,” from the University of Virginia School of Law.  Here is the abstract:

The Journal Sentinel is reporting that Justice Rebecca Bradley may participate in cases that were argued, but not decided, before Governor Walker appointed her to SCOW. Click here. She is studying the issue. Justice Geske and NYU law Professor Stephen Gillers see no problem with this idea. Bradley could just listen to oral argument transcripts and then vote.

La Crosse County HSD v. C.J.T., 2015AP252, District 4, 10/16/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The fact that the County’s attorney handling this TPR proceeding retained the GAL in the case to represent the her in an unrelated personal injury matter didn’t create a conflict of interest that required a new trial.