On Point

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; affirmed 2016 WI 17; case activity (for 2014AP1248-CR, which links to the other consolidated cases)

Issues (composed by On Point from the PFR)

Where the State agreed to cap its sentence recommendation on four cases at the “high end” of the recommendation of the presentence investigation (PSI) and the PSI did not recommend whether the sentences in the cases should be served concurrently or consecutively, did the State breach the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences?

Was there a sufficient factual basis for a plea to party to the crime of felony theft for “taking and carrying away” property when the defendant had no knowledge of the theft, but only received the stolen property and then moved it to a different location?

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; affirmed 2016 WI 26; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does a defendant have the right to testify at the mental responsibility phase of a bifurcated criminal proceeding?

If so, is an on-the-record colloquy regarding the waiver of the right to testify required?

State v. T.N., 2014AP2407 & 2014AP2408, District 4, 9/10/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly entered a default judgment against T.N. in his TPR proceeding when, despite the court’s warnings and admonitions, T.N. failed to appear at a scheduled court appearance.

Mark D. Jensen v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1380, 9/8/15, affirming Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)

At Jensen’s trial for the murder of his wife Julie the State introduced Julie’s handwritten letter to the police, written two weeks before her death, in which she wrote she would never take her life and that her husband should be the suspect if anything should happen to her. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed the admission of the letter violated Jensen’s right to confrontation but found the error harmless. The Seventh Circuit holds that the court of appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error standard, and that the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence had a substantial and injurious influence or effect in determining the jury’s verdict, thus satisfying the actual prejudice standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

State v. Ryan H. Tentoni, 2015 WI App 77; case activity (including briefs)

Tentoni does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages delivered to another person’s phone and therefore can’t seek to suppress the text messages and other subsequently obtained phone records as fruit of the government’s illegal search of the phone.

State v. Manuel Talavera, 2015AP701-CR, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

To  justify a warrantless traffic stop based on a violation of § 346.34(1)(b), the officer doesn’t need evidence that a driver’s failure to signal before turning his vehicle actually affected other traffic because the statute simply requires motorists to signal turns whenever “other traffic may be affected by the movement.” Thus, evidence that Talavera failed to signal when there was a (police) vehicle following two car lengths behind him was sufficient to justify stopping him.

Ozaukee County v. C.Y.K., 2015AP1080-FT, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though the examining psychiatrist opined that C.Y.K. was not substantially incapable of making an informed choice about accepting or refusing medication or treatment, the record as a whole supported the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication and treatment.

Dear Readers: Thank you for your patience while we’ve updated On Point. It may seem that we’ve simply changed our look. After all, we’re sporting a new banner and tons of photos of folks explaining why we need public defenders. (Take a look. Their answers are truly inspiring!) But our real task was to modernize […]

Wayne Kubsch v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1898, 8/12/15

After being convicted of murdering his wife, her son, and her ex-husband, Kubsch was sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding on three grounds: (1) the Indiana trial court excluded evidence of a witness’s exculpatory hearsay statement to police; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in seeking admission of the witness’s hearsay statement; and (3) his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The court, over a dissent by one judge as to the first and second claims, rejects Kubsch’s arguments.

Myron A. Gladney v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3141, 8/26/15

In 2013 Gladney filed a habeas petition challenging his state conviction, which became final in 1999. The district court properly dismissed the petition as untimely because even if the limitations period could have been tolled until Gladney found out about his counsel’s failure to interview a defense witness, his petition would still have been filed well outside the adjusted limitations period. Nor can Gladney satisfy the narrow “actual innocence” exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to disregard the time limits for seeking federal habeas relief.