On Point

Columbia County v. Brittany N. Krumbeck, 2015AP1010, 1/14/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, our supreme court rejected the notion that “repeated weaving” within a lane, without more, amounts to reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Krumbeck invokes Post to attack her OWI conviction but the court of appeals concludes there were enough other facts to justify the stop.

Professor Murat Mungen, Florida State University College of Law, just published this article explaining how expunging a person’s criminal record reduces the chances that he will reoffend.

Some interesting posts on this subject have popped up around the blogosphere. In this “introductory post” on EDTA testing, evidence professor Colin Miller explains the flaw in the State’s contention that the FBI’s EDTA testing proved that the blood in Halbach’s car did not come from the tube of Avery’s blood that someone tampered with. And in this post, he discusses cases addressing the admissibility (or inadmissibility) of EDTA testing.

Village of Bayside v. Ryan Robert Olszewski, 2015AP1033-34; 1/12/15; District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

After Heien v. North Carolina and State v. Houghton, everyone predicted lots of litigation about law enforcement’s “reasonable mistakes of law” during traffic stops. This case marks the beginning of it.

State v. Gregory Tyson Below, 2014AP2614-2616-CR, 1/12,16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

This was a high profile case in Milwaukee. Below was convicted of 29 charges of kidnapping, strangulation and suffocation, sexual assault, battery, reckless injury and solicitation of prostitutes. He appealed and asserted 4 claims for a new trial. The court of appeals rejected all of them.

State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.

Barron County DHHS v. J.H., 2015AP1529, District 3, 1/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.H.’s claims that her trial counsel was ineffective are rejected because trial counsel’s actions were either not deficient or not prejudicial.

K.C. v. B.S.-S., 2015AP1702, District 2, 1/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.S.-S.’s single conviction for intentionally causing harm to a child in violation of § 948.03(2)(b) does not demonstrate “a pattern of physically … abusive behavior” under § 48.415(5), so the circuit court erred in terminating B.S.-S.’s parental rights based on that conviction.

State v. Joseph C. Risse, 2015AP586, District 3, 1/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Risse pled to an OWI, but was it his first or second? The state, armed with a Wisconsin Certified Driving Record, says he had a 2008 chemical test refusal in Connecticut. Risse, bearing a collection of documents from Connecticut and elsewhere, submits that they prevent the state from showing the prior beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (January 12, 2016); reversing and remanding Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Florida the jury makes a recommendation as to whether to impose the death penalty, but the judge then holds a separate sentencing hearing and decides whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. This sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” (Slip op. at 1).