On Point

Question presented:

Whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

No, it’s not your imagination. Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinions have ballooned in recent years. The latest post on SCOWstats.com shows just how much they’ve sprawled, which justices are most prolix, and which are the pithiest. (Spoiler alert: Thank you, Justice Bradley. And keep up the good work, Justice Crooks!) If, as Shakespeare wrote, “brevity […]

Ozaukee County DHS v. J.R. and S.R., 2804-2809, 6/3/15, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket

Sec. 48.21(7) allows the circuit court to dismiss or informally dispose of a CHIPS petition, if doing so would be in the best interests of the child and the public. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of several CHIPS petitions in this case because the children at issue were not in custody. The statute, said the court of appeals, applies only to children who are in custody.

Ozaukee County v. Michael T. Sheedy, 2015AP172, 6/3/15, District 3 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Sheedy was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a blood test.  A few weeks later, the circuit court entered a default judgement against him. On appeal, Sheedy, pro se, argued that he in fact wrote to the circuit court and asked to reopen his case within the 10 days required by §343.305(2).  His appeal failed.

Kenosha County v. James H., 2014AP2945, 6/3/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for case activity

James was diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and hospitalized many times. He appeal an order extending his involuntary commitment and argued, unsuccessfully, that the county failed to present evidence of recent acts of violence against others and insufficient evidence that he would become dangerous if treatment were withdrawn.

State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.

State v. Mary G., 2015AP55, 2015AP56, & 2015AP57, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At the grounds phase of the trial on a TPR petition, the circuit court properly ordered Mary G. to provide the State with notes from her mental health treatment provider and appropriately considered evidence regarding Mary’s failure to manage her medications.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

Mellouli v. Lynch, USSC No. 1034, 2015 WL 2464047 (June 1, 2015), reversing Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the statute providing for deportation based on a violation of a state drug crime “relating to a controlled substance” is limited to “controlled substance” listed in the federal controlled substances schedule under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to hold that any drug offense triggers the removal statute, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule.

State v. Jeffrey F. Smart, 2014AP2604, District 2, 5/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The warrantless entry into Smart’s hotel room was supported by probable cause and justified by exigent circumstances because there was an objective basis to believe there was a risk to the safety of Smart’s children.