On Point

Question presented:

Did the Georgia courts err in failing to recognize race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case?

Question presented:

Whether the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)—which requires a prison term of at least ten years if a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”—is triggered by a prior conviction under a state law relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward.”

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. David E. Hull, 2015 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

The recently enacted statute allowing the admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it affects only the evidence that may be admitted at the preliminary hearing and does not alter the quantum or nature of evidence necessary to convict the defendant. In addition, the court commissioner properly refused to allow Hull to call the alleged victim to testify at the preliminary hearing because the anticipated testimony was not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.

State v. Shaun M. Clarmont, 2014AP1043-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Even if trial counsel failed to investigate a defense to the charge to which Clarmont pled, Clarmont has not shown why he would have gone to trial and face the possibility of multiple convictions, including for two felony offenses, rather than accept a plea offer of a single misdemeanor conviction along with a very favorable sentencing recommendation from the state.

State v. Chaz L. Brown, 2014AP1848-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A “midsummer night’s attempt at self-help debt collection” (¶2) led to Brown being charged with disorderly conduct and battery. He was acquitted of the battery charges based on his self-defense claim, but he was convicted of the DC. (¶¶2-5). Based on Brown’s conduct during the entire incident, there was sufficient evidence showing a causal connection between Brown’s DC and the battery victim’s damages to support the trial court’s restitution order.

Coleman v. Tollefson, USSC No. 13-1333, 2015 WL 2340838 (May 18, 2015), affirming Coleman v. Tollefson, 733 F.3d 175 (6th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Ordinarily, an indigent litigant may proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows the litigant to file a civil action without paying fees or certain expenses. But under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a “three strikes” provision precludes IFP status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated …, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But what if the prisoner is appealing one of the “strikes” and the appeal is still pending; does it still count as a “strike”? “Yes,” answers a unanimous Supreme Court.

Henderson v. United States, USSC No. 13-1487, 2015 WL 2340840 (May 18, 2015), reversing  United States v. Henderson, Case No. 12-14628, 2014 WL 292169 (11th Cir. 2014) (unreported); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a defendant convicted of a felony retains “a naked right of alienation” in any firearms he or she owns and therefore may arrange for a court-supervised sale or transfer the guns without violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm.

City and County of San Francisco, et al. v. Teresa Sheehan, USSC No. 13-1412, 2015 WL 2340839 (May 18, 2015), certiorari dismissed in part, and reversing in part and remanding Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because there was no precedent clearly establishing that it unreasonable to forcibly enter the home of a mentally ill person who is armed and potentially violent, the officers who entered Sheehan’s apartment are entitled to qualified immunity.