On Point

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that § 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, is a strict liability crime and does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance.

State v. Michael R. Griep, 2015 WI 40, 4/23/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity (including briefs)

Opinion testimony by a qualified expert based on data produced by an unavailable forensic lab analyst doesn’t violate a defendant’s right to confrontation if the testifying expert formed an “independent” opinion based on a review of the unavailable analyst’s data.

Dane County v. Thomas F.W., 2014AP2469, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

To extend a ch. 51 commitment, the County must prove the subject individual is a proper subject for treatment, which means showing he or she is “capable of rehabilitation,” §§ 51.01(17) and 51.20(1)(a)1. The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s argument that the evidence in this case shows treatment will only blunt the symptoms of his mental illness, not rehabilitate him.

State v. Zach Geyer, 2014AP2625-CR, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under the totality of the circumstances, police had probable cause to arrest Geyer for OWI.

Village of Chenequa v. Chad C. Schmalz, 2015AP94-FT, District 2, 4/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The stop of Schmalz’s car was not supported by reasonable suspicion or justified by the community caretaker doctrine.

Rodriguez v. United States, USSC No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927 (April 21, 2015), reversing United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Some lower courts have held that police may briefly prolong a completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. The Supreme Court rejects that approach, and holds that a seizure justified only by a traffic violation “‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” (Slip op. at 1, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). Thus, prolonging a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic infraction.

State v. Jennifer L. Wilson, 2014AP2358-CR, District 3, 4/21/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person’s presence in an area with frequent calls for drug activity and a suspected drug house is not, by itself, enough to justify an investigative stop of the person; the police must have particularized information that the person might be engaged in criminal activity. Police lacked that kind of particularized information in this case, so the stop was unlawful.

What a difference 18 years makes.  In 1995-96, SCOW issued 75 decisions. A whopping 87% of them were unanimous.  Abrahamson was in the majority 90% of the time. And the average number of days from oral argument to decision was 86. Now consider last term: 2013-14.  SCOW issued just 61 decisions. Only 39% of them were […]

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

Did the community caretaker rule authorize police to conduct a “protective sweep” of a home even though the person who needed assistance had already been identified and transported to a hospital for treatment?

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point):

Do §§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2) require the final CHIPS order filed before a TPR petition warn the parent about grounds for termination and the conditions for return or the child, or is it sufficient that the parent was given “adequate notice” of the grounds for termination and conditions of return during the pendency of the CHIPS proceeding?