On Point

Review of a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the parking garage of an apartment complex without a warrant and without the consent of a resident of the complex?

On certification by the court of appeals; review granted 11/26/13; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; click here for docket and briefs

Issue (composed by the court of appeals):

How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?  If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?

State v. Rory A. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, petition for review granted 11/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)

McKellips is entitled to a new trial on charges he used a computer to facilitate a child sex crime because the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system,” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.”

State v. Wade M. Richey, 2014AP1758-CR, District 3, 3/17/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In this prosecution for reckless driving causing great bodily harm and homicide by operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance, the circuit court erroneously excluded Richey’s medical records from evidence at trial, though the error was harmless. More interesting, perhaps, is the issue arising out of the trial court’s post-verdict meeting with the jury. While it wasn’t plain error for the trial judge to meet with the jury after receiving its verdict, what happened in this case causes the court of appeals to suggest trial judges tread carefully when doing so.

Question presented:

Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

Question presented:

Does a conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy?

Dane County v. P.H., 2014AP1469, District 4, 3/12/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rejecting P.H.’s claim that the experts who testified based their opinions on “dated” information, the court of appeals finds the evidence was sufficient to extend P.H.’s ch. 51 commitment.

Milwaukee City Housing Authority v. Cobb, 2015 WI 27, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity (including briefs)

A tenant living in federally subsidized housing does not need to be given an opportunity to remedy the default when he or she violates the lease by engaging in “drug-related criminal activity” because federal law governing subsidized public housing preempts state law right-to-remedy requirements.

State v. Gary Monroe Scull, 2015 WI 22, 3/5/16, affirming a published court of appeals decision; lead opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that fails to engage the real issue presented in the case, the supreme court holds that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, allows the admission of evidence seized using a search warrant that was based on information collected in violation of Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013).

State v. Charles W. Adams, 2015 WI App 34; click here for docket and briefs.

§ 942.09(2)(am)1 prohibits recording someone in the nude, without the person’s consent, in circumstances where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and where the recorder had reason to know that the nude person did not consent to the recording. This case holds that the statute protects a prostitute who is videotaped nude during commercial sexual activity.