On Point

State v. Mariah E., 2014AP1788, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The decision to waive a juvenile into adult court is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion, State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192, and in this case the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving sixteen-year-old Mariah to adult court on charges of battery of a police officer, battery to an emergency worker, and resisting and obstructing.

Fond du Lac County v. Robyn M. Pollack, 2014AP1936, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Pollack’s license was properly revoked after refusing a chemical test because the police officer had probable cause to arrest her for OWI under the totality of the circumstances.

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Can a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary to uphold a seizure under article I, §11 of the Wisconsin constitution?

Milwaukee County v. Andy S., 2014AP1885, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., as it showed Andy “[e]vidence[d] a substantial probability of physical harm to himself … as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”

State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.

Whitfield v. United States, USSC No. 13-9026, 2015 WL 144680 (January 13, 2015), affirming United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a bank robber forces a person to “accompany” him for purposes of the enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance.

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Terrance L. Ware, 2014AP378-CR, District 1, 12/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative stop of Ware’s car gave the police reasonable suspicion that Ware or his passenger was dangerous and might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, justifying a protective search of the car for weapons. In addition, a police officer wasn’t vouching for another state’s witness by saying the witness “told the truth” after additional questioning.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.