On Point

Whitfield v. United States, USSC No. 13-9026, 2015 WL 144680 (January 13, 2015), affirming United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a bank robber forces a person to “accompany” him for purposes of the enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance.

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Terrance L. Ware, 2014AP378-CR, District 1, 12/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative stop of Ware’s car gave the police reasonable suspicion that Ware or his passenger was dangerous and might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, justifying a protective search of the car for weapons. In addition, a police officer wasn’t vouching for another state’s witness by saying the witness “told the truth” after additional questioning.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.

County of Fond du Lac v. Jeffrey K. Krueger, 2014AP1494, District 2, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity Krueger was stopped by an officer who said Krueger drove his car over the center line. Krueger disputed that and moved to suppress. At the suppression hearing the officer testified and the video from his squad car camera was played. […]

State v. Cassius A. Foster, 2014 WI 131, 12/26/14, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

State v. Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 12/26/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

State v. Michael R. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 12/26/14, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

In these three cases, the supreme court addresses two issues arising from Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013): If a blood draw was conducted before McNeely in reliance on State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule mean the test results should not be suppressed? And, if the dissipation of alcohol by itself doesn’t constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw, what circumstances do establish such an exigency? Foster and Kennedy hold that the good-faith exception applies to pre-McNeely searches. Tullberg addresses the second question.

State v. Lance F., 2014AP1881-FT, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court lacks authority to order a juvenile (who had been found delinquent for battery, disorderly conduct and physical abuse of a child) to make restitution of the victim’s missing property, where he was never charged with theft of the property, he never admitted to stealing the property, and the state did not read in charges relating to theft of the property. The court explained:

Winnebago County DHS v. Ashley A.O., 2014AP2404, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court may not enter a summary judgment finding a parent unfit during the grounds phases of a TPR proceeding when that finding is based on an order denying the parent physical placement due to his (or her) incarceration.

State v. Charles V. Matalonis, 2014AP108-CR, District 2/4, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/17/15; case activity

The warrantless search of Matalonis’s home, which led to the discovery of marijuana, was not justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement because there was no reasonable basis to believe there was an injured person in the home.