On Point

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.

State v. Ester M. and Alexander M., 2014AP1621, District 1, 12/16/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s order finding Soreh M. to be a juvenile in need of protection or services  evidence is supported by sufficient and doesn’t impinge on the right to religious freedom of her parents, Ester M. and Alexander M. In addition, the circuit court had the statutory authority to order conditions for the parents to complete before the court would consider placing Soreh M. in their home again.

Heien v. North Carolina, USSC No. 13-604, 2014 WL 7010684 (December 15, 2014), affirming State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Rejecting the position taken by Wisconsin and the clear majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, the Supreme Court holds that a reasonable mistake of law may give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory seizure under the Fourth Amendment. While a statement of the Court’s holding is simple, its decision doesn’t fully articulate how courts are to determine when a mistake of law is “reasonable,” leading the sole dissenting Justice (Sotomayor) to predict lower courts will have difficulty applying the Court’s decision.

Questions presented:

1) Does the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), apply retroactively to this case?

2) Is a federal question raised by a claim that a state collateral review court erroneously failed to find that a new constitutional rule fits within an exception to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which held that new constitutional rules are generally not applied retroactively to cases on collateral review?

After 33 years with the State Public Defender, Marla Stephens is retiring today. Wow what a career! Cheers to Marla!

Kelli Thompson and Mike Tobin, Wisconsin State Public Defender
Marla’s contributions to the agency and the profession will be greatly missed, especially her dedication to the SPD and our clients, her work ethic, her long tenure as Chair of the Judicial Council, and her excellent leadership of the SPD Appellate Division.

State v. Douglas E. Hanson, 2014AP623-CR, District 4, 12/11/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Hanson failed to present sufficient credible evidence that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty to second offense OWI.

Warger v. Shauers, USSC No. 13-517, 2014 WL 6885952 (December 9, 2014), affirming Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that had split some federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court unanimously holds that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror’s affidavit or testimony about what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror was dishonest during voir dire.

State v. Steven L. Kaulfuerst, 2014AP1428-CR, District 2, 12/10/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The pat-down search of Kaulfuerst was lawful because police had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, even though police had not arrested him for that offense.

State v. David C. Marker, 2014AP1122-CR, District 2, 12/10/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of the vehicle Marker was driving was justified under the community caretaker exception because, based on a call from Marker’s ex-wife, police had reason to believe Marker was driving while intoxicated with his children in the vehicle.