On Point

State v. Lawrence L. Holmes, 2013AP2342-CR, District 4, 10/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Because Holmes can’t show that the court would have granted his motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges in the case with prejudice, he hasn’t shown he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s advice to enter into a plea agreement because he was going to lose the motion to dismiss.

State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

State v. Millard Reno Bandy, Sr., 2014AP1055-CR & 2014AP1056-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP1055-CR; 2014AP1056-CR

A defendant’s history of domestic violence against a victim provided a basis for trial court to increase the period of probation under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. even though the offenses for which the defendant was placed on probation didn’t involve physical harm or a direct threat to the victim.

State v. David A. Myhre, 2014AP376-CR, District 4, 10/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Myhre was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he answered questions posed by a DNR warden while sitting in the warden’s truck. Thus, the warden was not required to advise Myhre of his Miranda rights.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and

(2) Whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether a state court’s rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision; and

(2) Whether the court of appeals properly applied the standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?

State v. Sean T. Pugh, 2013AP1522-CR, District 3, 10/21/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

If the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Pugh had a prior conviction for an offense similar to the ones he was on trial for, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence against him. In addition, the trial court properly allowed the state to amend the information to add party-to-a-crime modifiers because Pugh wasn’t prejudiced by the amendment.

State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.

Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)

Issues (composed by On Point)

In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?

Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?