On Point

Justin P. Brandl, 2014AP1036-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though police did not see any traffic violations or erratic driving, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and made the stop of Brandl’s motorcycle lawful.

State v. Jeramy J. Qualls, 2014AP141-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Without resolving the burning issue of whether ash from a cigarette violates the Village of Pleasant Prairie’s littering ordinance, the court of appeals holds that a police officer lawfully stopped Qualls’s car because he had reason to believe someone in the car threw a cigarette out the window.

State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity

The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2013AP646-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 11/4/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 58; case activity

The sentencing court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by relying in part on Gayton’s immigration status or by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the maximum term of initial confinement and the DNA surcharge.

State v. Anthony E. Henderson, 2013AP2515, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

If the trial court erred in excluding a witness’s attorney from testifying to information that would have impeached the witness, that error was harmless.

State v. Adam J. Gajeski, 2014AP612-CR, District 3, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on a theft charge because the jury could have reasonably inferred Gajeski intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time he took the property.

State v. Albert Lorenzo Finch, Sr., 2014AP744-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Dodging an issue that has not been addressed in Wisconsin, the court of appeals assumes that even if the admission of the recording of a 911 call violated Finch’s right to confrontation the error was harmless because there was ample other evidence supporting the verdict.

Questions presented:

1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?

2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?

Question presented:

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are de minimis intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.