On Point

State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Salzwedel’s motion to suppress and her conviction for OWI (3rd offense). Apparently, a deputy was driving right behind Salzwedel when she made a quick left turn in front of him without using her turn signal.  The court of appeals held that the deputy had probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of §346.34(1)b,

Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims.  R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).

State v. Gabriel Justin Bogan, 2014AP285-CR, District 1, 10/14/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

In this 1st-degree reckless homicide and 1st-degree reckless endangering safety case, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented at trial did not support a “defense of others” jury instruction. Thus, Bogan’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to pursue that theory of defense.

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2014AP515-FT, 10/9/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 1/16/15; reversed, 2015 WI 101; case activity

Iverson won a motion to suppress and dismissal of his first OWI.  He prevailed again on appeal.  Turns out the state trooper did not stop Iverson on suspicion of OWI.  He initiated the stop because he observed a cigarette butt being tossed from the passenger side of Iverson’s Jeep, which is neither a crime nor a traffic violation.  Thus, traffic stops based on non-traffic forfeiture offenses are illegal.

State v. Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon, 2014 WI App 114, petition for review granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 73; case activity

Ortiz-Mondragon’s trial counsel wasn’t ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), for failing to advise Ortiz-Mondragon that his convictions were “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) and would result in mandatory deportation and a permanent bar on reentry. Unlike the conviction in Padilla, CIMT is a “broad classification of crimes” that escapes precise definition, and there’s no clear authority indicating any of the crimes to which Ortiz-Mondragon pled were crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the deportation consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon’s plea was unclear and uncertain, and his attorney wasn’t deficient in failing to unequivocally inform him that his plea would result in deportation and inadmissibility.

Recently, Foley & Lardner’s appellate blog analyzed data on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 2013-2014 term and concluded that the court is not divided.  Meanwhile, the Wisconsin Law Journal conducted its own analysis of the same period and ran the headline “Supreme splits deepen.” Well, which is it?  SCOWstats takes a cold, hard look at the statistics and offers a broader perspective.  See the stats for yourself and draw your own conclusions.

State v. Robert A. Harris, 2014AP965-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable suspicion that Harris was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated and the length of Harris’s detention was not unreasonable.

Justin P. Brandl, 2014AP1036-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though police did not see any traffic violations or erratic driving, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and made the stop of Brandl’s motorcycle lawful.

State v. Jeramy J. Qualls, 2014AP141-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Without resolving the burning issue of whether ash from a cigarette violates the Village of Pleasant Prairie’s littering ordinance, the court of appeals holds that a police officer lawfully stopped Qualls’s car because he had reason to believe someone in the car threw a cigarette out the window.

State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity

The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.