On Point

Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.

On review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search of a home conducted in reliance on a search warrant that was itself based on a search by a drug-sniffing dog that violated Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)?

On review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the circuit court’s violation of Harrison’s right to substitution under § 971.20 deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case and render the judgment void, or can the violation be deemed to be harmless error?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court is revisiting State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 N.W2d 741, a splintered decision (4 different rationales) with an impenetrable rule.  In this case, the State obtained two statements from the defendant after he had appeared at arraignment with appointed counsel.  The issue is whether the State violated his Sixth Amendment rights.

On review of published court of appeals decisions: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; case activity: Alger; Knipfer

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does the filing of a petition for discharge or supervised release under ch. 980 after the effective date of the adoption of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 “commence” an action or proceeding such that the Daubert standard for expert witness testimony applies to the discharge or supervised release proceeding?

If the filing of a discharge or supervised release petition after the effective date of Act 2 does not commence a new proceeding, does it violate due process or equal protection to refuse to apply the Daubert standard to the proceedings on those petitions?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

Whether a juvenile “refused to respond or cooperate” during a portion of a custodial interrogation if it was going to be recorded, such that § 938.31(3)(c)1. allowed the interrogating officers to turn off the recording device.

Whether an error in failing to record a portion of the custodial interrogation requires exclusion of the statements that were recorded.

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.

Yes, you read that headline correctly!  This happened in Ohio.  In case you missed it, here is the ABA Journal’s story.

State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 5/23/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Section 973.015 provides that a circuit court “may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence  . . .” SCOW now clarifies that a court must decide expunction at sentencing.  Circuit court practices varied, so this decision clarifies the law and sets the stage for (possibly) a bigger battle over Wisconsin’s expunction statute.

Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)

Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and  seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.