On Point

State v. Donald Ray Michael, 2012AP2738-CR, District 1, 6/10/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Michael is entitled to a new trial on reckless injury and felon in possession of a firearm charges because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to introduce evidence from the police department’s computer automated dispatch (CAD) report and failing to present testimony from an eyewitness to the incident.

State v. Dwayne F., Jr., 2014AP595, District 1, 6/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the best interests of Dwayne F.’s daughter would be served by a guardianship with the Child Welfare Bureau for adoption by her foster family, instead of placement with Dwayne F.’s father.

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Peter J. Thompson, 2014 WI 25; case activity

The supreme court rejects OLR’s attempt to discipline a lawyer who disclosed confidential client information in advance of a Machner hearing, finding the context in which the disclosure was made to be “of critical importance” to its determination (¶26) while also reminding lawyers to “proceed with caution when considering disclosure of confidential client information in response to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” (¶1).

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Daniel W. Johns, Jr., 2014 WI 32; case activity

Because OLR was actually informed of an attorney’s felony conviction, the attorney’s failure to notify OLR of the conviction in writing under SCR 21.15(5) is “too technical” a violation to justify discipline. In addition, the nature of the conviction didn’t adversely reflect on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, so discipline was not merited under SCR 20:8.4(b).

State v. Adam W. Miller, 2013AP2218; 6/5/14; District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals holds that a circuit court may apply the § 939.62(1)(c) penalty enhancer to increase Miller’s term of initial confinement beyond the maximum prescribed by law without first imposing the maximum term of imprisonment, as in the maximums for both initial confinement and extended supervision.

Yes, the judge really made that threat. And, yes, the two really came to blows.  Think Tom Petty’s “And I Won’t Back Down” and then click here to read the article and watch the video clip of the courtroom trash talk that led the judge and the PD to step outside and duke it out.  The fight is also audible.   Yikes!

State v. Patrick L. Hibl, 2013AP2723-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rejecting challenges to a restitution order, the court of appeals holds that the evidence in the record established a nexus between the crime Hibl was convicted of and the victim’s loss and that the circuit court took account of his ability to pay.

State v. Alberta R. Rose, 2013AP2783-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer’s observations of a car “smoothly swerving three or four times” in its lane of travel over several blocks and then “appear[ing] to strike the center line” (¶2) provided reasonable suspicion to perform a valid investigatory stop of the car, even though an enhanced version of the squad car video showed the car didn’t hit the center line.

State v. Antonio D. Williams, 2013AP814; 6/3/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal raises a host of issues but the most interesting concern the trial court’s decisions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s cooperating witnesses, all of whom were testifying in the hopes of receiving reduced sentences for themselves, about the maximum penalties they faced; and (2) allow the State to use a letter police found in an envelope marked “for my lawyer” to impeach Williams’s alibi witness.

Carol Anne Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-148 (June 2, 2014), reversing United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3rd Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Avoiding a constitutional question about the limits on Congress’s power to pass legislation implementing an international treaty, a majority of the Supreme Court narrowly construes a federal statute enacted after ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention so that it does not cover the defendant’s conduct in this case. By limiting the statute’s reach, the Court’s construction will preclude federal prosecutors from using it to charge “a purely local crime[.]” (Slip op. at 2).