On Point

State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.

New Berlin v. John Francis Downey, 2013AP 2352-FT, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

An on-duty police officer had authority to stop Downey outside his jurisdiction because he was acting in response to an “emergency situation,” § 175.40(6)(a), and because he was in fresh pursuit of a law violator, § 175.40(2).

Waukesha County v. Dushyant N. Patel, 2013AP2292, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The result of a blood draw done in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), are admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because police acted in conformity with clear, well-settled Wisconsin law that permitted the blood draw at the time it was done, even if the arresting officer didn’t cite that law in justifying the blood draw.

State v. Andrew K. Wenz, 2013AP2576-CR, District 1, 5/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop his car because the content of a tip from a known, reliable informant allowed police to ascertain whether they were stopping the correct vehicle.

State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.

State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.

State v. Shawn N. Hill, 2013AP2549-CR, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A vehicle registered by the State as a “utility terrain vehicle” under § 23.33(1)(ng) is not a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). Thus, a defendant alleged to have operated the vehicle while intoxicated should have been charged under § 23.33(4c), not § 346.63.

Village of Grafton v. Carl J. Schlegel, 2013AP2521, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to ask Schlegel to submit to a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 even though he wasn’t asked to perform field sobriety tests first, and the result of the PBT, along with the rest of the facts, gave police probable cause to arrest Schlegel for OWI.

State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity

This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense.  Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial.  The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.

Robers v. United States, USSC No. 12-9012, 5/5/14, affirming United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and case commentary); On Point’s previous coverage.

Where a defendant is ordered to pay restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), the amount of restitution may be reduced by the value of “any part of the property that is returned” to the victim. The Supreme Court holds that a a defendant convicted of fraudulently obtaining a loan does not return part of the property to the defrauded lender when the lender takes title to the collateral securing the loan. Therefore, restitution is not reduced by the fair market value of the collateral at the time the lender took title.