On Point

A young, female law student posed this provocative question to Chuck Klosterman, The Ethicist for The New York Times.  An excerpt from the Ethicist’s column in yesterday’s New York Times Magazine  is copied in below.

IF IT PLEASES THE COURT . . .

I am a young, female law student who represents indigent clients in criminal matters. I have learned (both from professionals at my school and from studies on subliminal biases) that female attorneys are more likely to be taken seriously if they have straight hair and wear makeup, skirts and heels. This is not a norm I want to perpetuate. However, I know that I have an ethical responsibility to represent my clients to the best of my ability. But do I have to conform to gender norms I find oppressive if there is a chance it will help my client? NAME WITHHELD

Esteban Martinez v. Illinois, USSC No. 13-5367 (May 27, 2014) (per curiam), reversing State v. Martinez, 990 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2013)

In this unanimous per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms two clear rules of criminal procedure: jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn; and a trial court’s dismissal of the case due to insufficient evidence is an acquittal. Added together, the two rules mean the defendant cannot be retried.

Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.

State v. Joshua D. Winberg, 2013AP2661-CR, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The driver of a car stopped based on officer’s knowledge that the car owner’s license was revoked was not unlawfully seized because, even thought it was immediately apparent the car owner was not driving, the police also immediately observed additional suspicious information that justified the continued detention of the driver.

Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.

On review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search of a home conducted in reliance on a search warrant that was itself based on a search by a drug-sniffing dog that violated Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)?

On review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the circuit court’s violation of Harrison’s right to substitution under § 971.20 deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case and render the judgment void, or can the violation be deemed to be harmless error?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court is revisiting State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 N.W2d 741, a splintered decision (4 different rationales) with an impenetrable rule.  In this case, the State obtained two statements from the defendant after he had appeared at arraignment with appointed counsel.  The issue is whether the State violated his Sixth Amendment rights.

On review of published court of appeals decisions: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; case activity: Alger; Knipfer

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does the filing of a petition for discharge or supervised release under ch. 980 after the effective date of the adoption of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 “commence” an action or proceeding such that the Daubert standard for expert witness testimony applies to the discharge or supervised release proceeding?

If the filing of a discharge or supervised release petition after the effective date of Act 2 does not commence a new proceeding, does it violate due process or equal protection to refuse to apply the Daubert standard to the proceedings on those petitions?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

Whether a juvenile “refused to respond or cooperate” during a portion of a custodial interrogation if it was going to be recorded, such that § 938.31(3)(c)1. allowed the interrogating officers to turn off the recording device.

Whether an error in failing to record a portion of the custodial interrogation requires exclusion of the statements that were recorded.